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EXAMINING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
EXPERIENCE IN ADOPTING THE 




n major markets around the world there has been a grow-
ing trend towards unification of responsibility for the regu-
lation of banks, securities markets, and insurance compa-
nies.1  Countries where a unified agency has recently assumed 
regulatory responsibilities for all financial institutions include 
the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), Japan, and Korea.2  In May 2002, 
Germany established a single financial regulator.3  Ireland and 
Switzerland are also in the process of moving towards the single 
regulator model.4  The increasing popularity of the single regu-
lator model in Europe should be viewed against the background 
  
 * Eilís Ferran, Reader in Corporate Law and Financial Regulation and 
Director of the Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law (3CL), University of 
Cambridge, United Kingdom.  E-mail: evf1000@cam.ac.uk.   
  I am grateful for comments from Kern Alexander, Chris Bates, Rod 
Cantrill, James Fanto, Niamh Moloney, Tolek Petch, and participants at the 
Brooklyn Law School Symposium Do Financial Supermarkets Need Super 
Regulators?, September 20, 2002.  This Article reflects the position as of Sep-
tember 2002, but with occasional references to more recent material. 
 1. Kenneth K. Mwenda & Alex Fleming, International Developments in 
the Organizational Structure of Financial Services Supervision, Paper Pre-
sented at the World Bank Financial Sector Vice-Presidency Seminar, at 1 
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org.  
 2. NEIL COURTIS, HOW COUNTRIES SUPERVISE THEIR BANKS, INSURERS AND 
SECURITIES MARKETS xiii (2d ed. 2002).  Although Courtis classifies Australia 
as a single regulator country, its approach is distinctive in that it divides be-
tween two agencies responsibility for prudential regulation (Australian Pru-
dential Regulation Authority) and for conduct of business (Australian Securi-
ties and Investment Commission).  The Netherlands is considering the adop-
tion of a similar cross-sectoral, objective-driven model.  See Annet Jonk et al., 
A New Dutch Model, 6 FI N. REG. 35 (2001).  
 3. Hugh Williamson, Boost for Germany’s Financial Role: Federal Agency 
Three Regulatory Bodies to be Merged into Single Authority from May 1, FI N. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at 12. 
 4. Howard Davies, Foreword — The Importance of Getting Supervision 
Right, in COURTIS, supra note 2, at xi. 
I 
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of the policy objectives of the European Union (“EU”) in the es-
tablishment of a fully integrated financial market.  The conver-
gence of national regulatory structures of member states has 
been identified as a necessary step for the achievement of that 
good.5  
Scandinavian countries led the way in establishing unitary 
financial regulators.6  Norway was the first country to establish 
an integrated regulatory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark 
in 1988, and Sweden in 1991.7  However, as the first major in-
ternational financial center to adopt the single regulator 
model,8 changes made in the U.K. have attracted particular in-
ternational attention.  For countries that are major financial 
centers,9 an important argument in favor of the single regulator 
model is that it matches the nature of their markets — in that 
the emergence of financial “supermarkets” and increased use of 
sophisticated techniques, such as securitization and derivatives 
trading, have broken down the traditional sectoral distinc-
tions.10  The trend towards the blurring of sectoral  boundaries 
intensified during the 1990s.11  The overhaul of the U.K.’s regu-
latory structure thus largely coincided with a period in which 
  
 5. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 42 (2001), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/ 
lamfalussyen.pdf. 
 6. Giorgio Di  Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia, Financial Market Regulation 
and Supervision: How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 
463, 469–78 (2002) (providing a general survey of European regulatory frame-
works). 
 7. MICHAEL TAYLOR & ALEX FLEMING, INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION : 
LESSONS FROM NORTHERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE  4–7 (World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 2223, 1999), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/950_wps 
2223.pdf.  Banking supervision has never been a central bank function in 
these countries so the Scandinavian experience has little guidance to offer on 
this aspect of regulatory consolidation. 
 8. CLIVE BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATOR 5 (FSA, Occasional Paper 2, 1999), available at  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/index-1999.html [hereinafter BRIAULT, 
THE RATIONALE]. 
 9. This argument may be less significant for countries with smaller or 
less mature markets.  See RICHARD K. ABRAMS & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, ISSUES 
IN THE UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION 10–14 (International 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/213, 2000), available at 
http://www.imt.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00213.pdf. 
 10. BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE, supra note 8, at 12–17.  
 11. Id. at 12–14. 
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the need for changes to national regulatory arrangements, in 
order to keep pace with the markets, was an issue for public 
policy debate in many countries.12   
In addition to trends in the international financial markets, 
changes to national financial regulatory structures are also 
driven by country-specific factors.13  This was certainly true in 
the U.K., where some of the impetus for change came from local 
financial scandals and collapses that were attributed, in part, to 
failings in the old system.14  Throughout the world, there is 
wide variety in the existing institutional arrangements and, 
despite the current interest in the single regulator model, its 
adoption in practice remains relatively rare.15  The powerful 
influence exerted by national historical roots and social, eco-
nomic, and political traditions16 means that this situation seems 
likely to persist.  To take the obvious example of the United 
States, adoption of the single regulator model would face practi-
cal and political hurdles that currently appear insurmount-
able.17  The recognition that national institutional arrange-
ments evolve under the influence of local factors, as well as 
global trends in financial markets, suggests that there is no one 
ideal institutional model that is universally applicable.  
While this Article makes no claim as to the superiority of the 
single regulator model, it considers what other countries may 
learn from the U.K.’s experience in adopting that structure.  A 
key feature is the extent of fundamental legal change that 
accompanied the U.K.’s shift to the single regulator model.  
Unlike some other countries, such as Korea which has a single 
regulatory agency but separate sectorally-divided legal re-
gimes,18 the U.K. has sought to match the unitary nature of its 
  
 12. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND 
WHERE NOW? 181 (1998).  
 13. Id. 
 14. BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE, supra note 8, at 8. 
 15. ABRAMS & TAYLOR , supra note 9, at 3.  But others see “clear signs” of a 
trend towards unified supervision, particularly for larger financial markets.  
See, e.g., COURTIS, supra note 2, at xiii. 
 16. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 145. 
 17. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, the creation 
of a single regulator would be “highly undesirable on both political and eco-
nomic grounds.”  ROSA MARIE LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING 
REGULATION 147 (1996). 
 18. See generally Joon Soo Lee, Integrated Financial Supervision: The Ko-
rean Experience (Asian Development Bank Project, 2002) available at 
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institutional arrangements for financial regulation with an in-
tegrated legal framework.  This ambitious approach means that 
the U.K. should be a particularly rich source of data on using 
the law to respond to the challenges involved in the process of 
regulatory consolidation.  Part II of this Article sets out the his-
torical background of the transition to the single financial regu-
lator model in the U.K.  Part III examines the key events in the 
transitional period between the announcement of the intended 
switch and the effectuation of the new unitary regime in De-
cember 2001.  Part IV looks at the main arguments — for and 
against — the single regulator model; how the British legisla-
ture responded to these arguments in shaping the legislative 
framework for the new regime; and at early indications of how 
successfully that framework is beginning to operate in practice.  
Part V offers one conclusion and some observations.  
II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ADOPTION OF THE SINGLE 
REGULATOR MODEL IN THE U.K. 
The 1980s were a period of regulatory upheaval in the U.K.  
At that time the U.K. had a fragmented regulatory structure, 
with different institutional arrangements and legal regimes in 
place for banking, securities, and insurance business.   This his-
torical survey examines key events in the period up to May 
1997, when a new Labour government was elected in place of 
the Conservative government that had been in power since 
1979.  
In the days immediately following the 1997 election, the new 
Labour government moved with remarkable swiftness to start 
the process of switching to the single regulator model.  This was 
one of the new government’s first major policy initiatives.19  
This begs the question: What had happened to put regulatory 




 19. Eva Lomnicka, Reforming U.K. Financial Services Regulation: The 
Creation of a Single Regulator, 1999 J. BUS. L. 480. 
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A. Banking Regulation20 
In the 1980s, regulatory responsibility for the U.K. banking 
sector lay with the central bank — the Bank of England (“the 
Bank”).  Although the Bank’s informal involvement in the su-
pervision of banks dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, it 
was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers to grant or re-
fuse authorization to carry on a banking business in the U.K.21   
Catalysts for the changes made by the Banking Act 1979 were 
the secondary banking crisis of 1973–1974 and the Banking Co-
ordination Directive of 1977, which was the first major step to-
wards European harmonization in the banking sector.22 
Banking failures continued to influence change throughout 
the following years.  In 1984, the collapse of Johnson Matthey 
Bankers Ltd. exposed defects in the framework established by 
the Banking Act 1979.23  As a consequence, that structure was 
replaced by a new legislative framework.24  The Banking Act 
1987 confirmed the Bank in its role as bank regulator and 
strengthened its supervisory powers.25  The 1987 Act introduced 
a new “Board of Banking Supervision” to assist the Bank in its 
supervisory functions.26  
In 1991 another bank failure —the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (“BCCI”) — again put the U.K. banking 
regulatory framework under scrutiny.27  Although international 
supervisory action coordinated by the Bank had brought about 
BCCI’s closure in 1991, the Bank was heavily criticized for not 
intervening sooner to stop BCCI’s fraudulent operations.28  An 
  
 20. This section draws upon chapter 1 of the INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION 
OF THE BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (HM Stationary Office, 
1992) [hereinafter BINGHAM REPORT], which provides an excellent overview of 
banking supervision in the U.K. in the period 1972–1992.  
 21. Banking Act, 1979 (Eng.) (repealed 1987). 
 22. BINGHAM REPORT, supra  note 20, ¶ 1.15. 
 23. Id. ¶ 1.38. 
 24. Banking Act, 1987 (Eng.) (repealed 2001). 
 25. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 1.47. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See generally Ray P. Kinsella, Some Regulatory and Supervisory Les-
sons of the BCCI Collapse, in INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE , RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 92/10, RESEARCH PAPERS IN BANKING AND FINANCE (1992); PETER 
TRUELL & LARRY GURWIN, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI,  THE 
WORLD ’S MOST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1992).  
 28. See generally Kinsella, supra note 27. 
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official inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Bingham, was con-
vened.  The inquiry found weaknesses in the Bank’s approach 
to coping with sophisticated fraud.  Specifically, it was found 
that the Bank relied too heavily on informal methods based on 
trust and frankness.29  It also identified gaps in the Bank’s pow-
ers.  In response, certain technical changes were made to the 
Banking Act 1987, as well as changes to the Bank’s supervisory 
practices.30  On the more radical question — whether a reor-
ganization of regulatory responsibility was required — the in-
quiry produced a negative response.31  The option of transfer-
ring banking regulatory responsibility from the central bank to 
an independent body was specifically rejected.32  The inquiry 
found nothing in the history of BCCI to invalidate the judg-
ment, made prior to the Banking Act 1987, to continue to en-
trust this task to the Bank.33   
The spectacular collapse of Barings in 1995 prompted another 
official inquiry in the U.K., this time by the Board of Banking 
Supervision.34  The Barings crisis had been triggered by mas-
sive unauthorized losses incurred by a single derivatives trader 
employed by the Singaporean arm of the Barings group.35 The 
official inquiry found that the main reasons for the collapse of 
Barings were management failings within Barings and lack of 
appropriate internal controls.36  In addition, it also found some 
failings in the Bank’s performance as the lead supervisor of the 
  
 29. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 3.8. 
 30. MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, HANDBOOK OF BANKING REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 133–34 (3d ed. 1999).  
 31. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 3.3. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 3.4–3.5. 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 3.4–3.5.  This issue had been carefully discussed in the WHITE 
PAPER ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 1985, Cmnd. 9695, which had preceded the 
Banking Act 1987.  Brian Quinn, The Influence of the Banking Acts (1979 and 
1987) on the Bank of England’s Traditional Style of Banking Supervision, in 
BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION  IN THE 1990S, at 1 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 
1991). 
 34. See REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (HM Stationary Office, 1995) 
[hereinafter COLLAPSE OF BARINGS REPORT].   
 35. NICK LEESON & EDWARD WHITLEY, ROGUE TRADER: HOW I BROUGHT 
DOWN BARINGS BANK AND SHOOK THE FINANCIAL WORLD (1996); LUKE HUNT & 
KAREN HEINRICH, BARINGS LOST : NICK LEESON AND THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS 
PLC (1996).   
 36. COLLAPSE OF BARINGS REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶ 13.10–13.12. 
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Barings group.37  Like the previous BCCI collapse, Barings pro-
vided a graphic illustration of the difficult challenges facing na-
tional regulators attempting to supervise complex multinational 
banking groups.  It also illustrated the need within a frag-
mented regulatory system for close contact and cooperation be-
tween banking and securities regulators in order to achieve ef-
fective supervision of financial supermarkets, whose businesses 
straddled the fuzzy boundaries between those sectors.38   
While bank failures were reflecting badly on the Bank in its 
regulatory role, a growing consensus was emerging among poli-
ticians and economists in favor of giving the central bank mone-
tary policy independence.39  Central bank independence is re-
garded as a practical consequence of the new economic ortho-
doxy in which monetary policy is the main instrument for deliv-
ering price stability.40  
The connection between monetary policy independence and 
the location of regulatory responsibility for the banking sector is 
that if the two functions are combined, regulatory concerns may 
create conflicts of interest that undermine policy independence.  
  
 37. Id. ¶¶ 13.57–13.61. 
 38. Id. ¶ 14.44.  The earlier collapse of a smaller bank (British & Com-
monwealth) in 1990 had also demonstrated the need for close cooperation 
between relevant regulatory bodies.  In the light of subsequent events, Hall’s 
comment on the British & Commonwealth situation was particularly percipi-
ent.  Hall stated: “one can but wonder if institutional rather than functional 
regulation would be a better way of dealing with the myriad public interest 
considerations which arise in connection with the regulation and supervision 
of highly diversified financial conglomerates.”  HALL, supra note 30, at 189 
n.134.  
 39. See generally LASTRA, supra note 17, at 10–62.  The issue of central 
bank independence is also partly tied up with the euro-entry debate and entry 
conditions because Article 108 of the Treaty of Amsterdam requires the mem-
ber state central banks which, along with the European Central Bank 
(“ECB”), form the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) to be inde-
pendent with regard to Treaty obligations. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING 
THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Nov.10, 1997, art. 108, 
O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997). 
 40. LASTRA, supra note 17, at 13–18; Michael Taylor, Central Bank Inde-
pendence: The Policy Background, in BLACKSTONE ’S GUIDE TO THE BANK OF 
ENGLAND ACT 1998, at 19–20 (Michael Blair et al. eds., 1998); Hossein Samiei 
& Jan Kees Martijn, Operational Independence and the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy in the United Kingdom, in HOSSEIN SAMIEI ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND: UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE  (IMF Staff Country Report 
No. 99/44, 1999). 
File: FERRAN Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  4/2/2003 1:23 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
264 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
Following Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker,41 Michael 
Taylor hypothesizes that a central bank might not want to ad-
just interest rates if to do so might trigger a number of bank 
failures for which it could be blamed.  Separating the monetary 
policy and regulatory roles would remove this conflict and leave 
the central bank to determine monetary policy free from extra-
neous influences.  But the arguments for and against separa-
tion of functions are finely balanced.42  This view is not, how-
ever, universal.  Arguments against separation include: the role 
of the central bank as lender of last resort; its oversight func-
tion in relation to the payment system; the need for consistency 
between monetary policy and banking supervision; and syner-
gistic advantages in concentration of functions.43  This debate 
indicates that a central bank will inevitably have continuing 
involvement in some aspects of the regulatory process because 
of its role in ensuring financial stability and, further, that the 
demarcation of its responsibilities and those of any other body 
that assumes a banking supervisory role is an issue that must 
be specifically addressed.  
Practical events and the evolution of the public policy eco-
nomic agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s thus provided vari-
ous reasons for considering change  in banking regulation.  It 
should also be noted that U.K. banking law and regulation was 
significantly amended during this period in order to implement 
various new European Community (“EC”) measures.44  These 
changes — though very significant in their own right in that 
they removed internal barriers to the free operation of banking 
activities throughout the EU — did not have a major direct im-
pact on the institutional framework of regulation and so they, 
and equivalent measures in securities and insurance law, do 
not require detailed examination here.45  Their immediate rele-
vance to the present discussion is that piecemeal changes to 
  
 41. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation 
Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, in CHARLES A.E. GOODHART , THE 
EMERGING FRAMEWORK OF FINANCI AL REGULATION 133, 141 (1998).  
 42. Taylor, supra note 40, at 20. 
 43. LASTRA, supra note 17, at 148–49.  
 44. See HALL, supra note 30, at 36.  
 45. See generally id. (providing an in-depth view of the evolution of super-
visory practice and the structure of banking supervision in the U.K.); 
CHRISTOS HADJIEMMANUIL , BANKING REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND  
(1996).  
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existing legislation and the addition of extra layers of regula-
tion, such as those that took place in the 1980s and 1990s to 
implement EU measures, added to the complexity of the 
framework and to compliance costs.  An advantage of a funda-
mental root-and-branch reform was that it would provide an 
opportunity for a thorough, principled assessment of how best 
to combine domestic and EU requirements into a coherent over-
all framework.46 
B. Securities Regulation47 
The history of the U.K. securities regulation in the 1980s and 
early 1990s paralleled that of banking regulation; it is the story 
of a system that was undermined by financial scandals that 
badly affected consumer confidence.  It was also a complex sys-
tem that exacerbated the problems involved in ensuring effec-
tive supervision of multi-function firms.  The excessively frag-
mented regulatory infrastructure of the securities industry 
meant that firms were often regulated by more than one regula-
tory agency, with the consequence that the  system was heavily 
dependent upon the quality and effectiveness of communica-
tions and cooperation between the regulators. To be sure, there 
was strong industry dissatisfaction with the system, because 
the presence of multiple regulators created an uncertainty as to 
boundaries and created inefficiencies.48  From its inception, the 
regulatory regime was the target of persistent criticism.  It was 
seen to be unwieldy and bureaucratic.  The extremely detailed, 
legalistic style of early versions of regulatory rulebooks did little 
to enhance the reputation of those responsible for the regime.49  
When even the head regulator acknowledged in 1993 that many 
  
 46. Alistair Darling, The Regulation of the U.K. Insurance Industry, 4 INT’L 
INS . L. REV. 171, 173 (1996). 
 47. This section draws upon  FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL (House 
of Commons Library Research Paper 99/68) June 24, 1999, available at  
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-068.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL]. 
 48. Amelia C. Fawcett, Examining the Objectives of Financial Regulation 
— Will the New Regime Succeed? A Practitioner’s View, in REGULATING 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 37, 47 (Eilís 
Ferran & Charles A. E. Goodhart eds., 2001) [hereinafter REGULATING IN THE 
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY]. 
 49. BEN PETTET, COMPANY LAW 340 (2001); Andrew M. Whittaker, Legal 
Technique in City Regulation, 43 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 35, 42 (1990). 
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of the criticisms were justified,50 it became indisputable that the 
U.K.’s defective securities regulation system was in dire need of 
reform.  
The source of the problems was the institutional structure es-
tablished under the Financial Services Act 1986.  Under the 
Act, ultimate regulatory responsibility for the financial services 
industry lay with a government department.  However, most 
regulatory powers were delegated to the Securities and Invest-
ments Board (“SIB”), a private company limited by guarantee 
and financed by a levy on market participants.51  The SIB set 
the overall framework of regulation but did not itself act as the 
direct regulator of most investment firms.  Second tier regula-
tors — of whom the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) were 
the most prominent group — performed that function.52  SROs 
were funded, and partly managed, by investment firms.  For 
this reason the style of regulation established by the Financial 
Services Act 1986, was sometimes described as “self-regulation 
within a statutory framework.”53  Underlying the emphasis on 
self-regulation in this description was a political compromise 
designed to assuage the concerns of market participants.  As 
was noted by Professor Gower, whose studies of U.K. securities 
regulation in the 1980s powerfully influenced the character of 
the regime, the intellectually appealing full statutory model 
could not be pursued at that time because it would have been 
unacceptable in light of prevailing market conditions.54  The 
extent to which the system established under the Financial 
Services Act 1986 truly retained a self-regulatory character in 
practice is debatable.55  That it was presented in this way how-
ever, soon had unfortunate repercussions.  Many observers 
  
 50. ANDREW LARGE, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION : MAKING THE TWO 
TIER SYSTEM WORK 10 (1993). 
 51. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 61 (Eng.). 
 52. LARGE, supra note 50, at 22, 45. 
 53. GUIDE TO FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 27 (Barry A. K. Rider et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 1997); ALAN C. PAGE & ROBERT B. FERGUSON, INVESTOR 
PROTECTION 78–105 (1992). 
 54. LAURENCE CECIL BARTLETT GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION : A  
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 75–83 (1982). 
 55. Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, “Big Bang” and City Regulation, 51 
MOD. L. REV. 1 (1988); Iain MacNeil, The Future for Financial Regulation: The 
Financial Services and Markets Bill, 62 MOD. L. REV. 725 (1999); Eilís Ferran, 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the U.K. Financial Sector, 21 CIV. JUST. Q. 
135, 137 (2002). 
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latched onto the self-regulatory dimension as a key reason why 
the regime failed to succeed.56  Yet, while growing mistrust of 
self-regulation undoubtedly played a part in the events that 
unfolded over the following years,57 the more potent seeds of the 
regime’s destruction lay in the complex two-tier structure and 
in the fragmentation at the SRO level.   
At the outset, there were five SROs; however, by 1994, only 
three remained — the Securities and Futures Authority 
(“SFA”), the Investment Managers’ Regulatory Organisation 
(“IMRO”), and the Personal Investment Authority (“PIA”).58  
Some of the changes to the institutional arrangements at the 
SRO level can be seen in a positive light, as being the dynamic 
response of a flexible and market-sensitive system to develop-
ments in the industry.59  But it is also the case that much of the 
change was driven by dissatisfaction about overlaps and possi-
ble gaps in the areas of responsibilities of the original SROs.60   
There were persistent concerns about the effectiveness of the 
SROs’ efforts to prevent fraud and misconduct.  The SROs at-
tracted severe criticism for having failed to protect the interests 
of consumers in a number of high-profile financial scandals.  
These included the Maxwell affair, where the IMRO’s failure to 
detect the theft of company pension fund assets by its control-
ler, Robert Maxwell, was the target of particular complaint.61  
Another notorious problem that damaged the reputation of the 
regulatory agencies in the early 1990s was that of pension mis-
selling, whereby investors were sold inappropriate pension in-
vestment products.62  Julia Black and Richard Nobles describe 
the pensions mis-selling episode as a manifestation of “a critical 
  
 56. GOWER, supra note 54 at 13–16. 
 57. Alistair Alcock, A Regulatory Monster, 1998 J. BUS. L. 371, 375. 
 58. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 10(2) (Eng.).  
 59. 4 Fin. Serv. Rep. (Sweet & Maxwell) ¶ 2-650 (Aug. 2000). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 2 SIR ROGER THOMAS ET AL., MIRROR GROUP NEWSPAPERS PLC . 
INVESTIGATIONS UNDER SECTION 432 (2) AND 442 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 
app. 9 (2001), provides a review of IMRO’s work in relation to Maxwell group 
companies and of changes made at IMRO after the eventual discovery of 
Maxwell’s fraudulent schemes.  On the other hand, PETTET, supra note 49, at 
341, presents a more positive assessment of the effectiveness of SRO discipli-
nary measures and the hard-hitting nature of their operations. 
 62. Gerard McMeel, The Consumer Dimension of Financial Services Law: 
Lessons from the Pensions Mis-selling Scandal, 3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY 
L. REV. 29, 29 (1999). 
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failing in the regulatory structure” involving “regulatory blind-
ness,” “lack of awareness,” and “lack of communication and co-
operation between the different regulators.”63 
In a personal assessment published after the Maxwell affair, 
the then Chairman of the SIB, Andrew Large, identified a num-
ber of problems that were thought to afflict the regime he 
headed: lack of clarity about regulatory objectives; lack of confi-
dence that self-regulation was anything other than self-interest; 
doubts about cost-effectiveness; and a feeling that fraud was 
going undetected.64  Chairman Large’s acknowledgement that 
many of these criticisms were justified set the agenda for policy 
discussions and political debate in the following years.65  By the 
end of 1995, it was a clearly articulated Labour Party policy, 
then in opposition, to remove the last remnants of self-
regulation and the “unnecessary” distinction between the SIB 
and the SROs.66  It seems likely that a Conservative govern-
ment would have traveled the  same route had it remained in 
power.  However, there was no indication at this stage of quite 
how radical the incoming Labour government would be.  The 
case for a single regulator for the whole of the financial sector 
did not yet figure prominently in the  discussions.   
C. Insurance67 
The regulation of the insurance industry in the 1980s and 
1990s was a complex affair, yet it attracted little attention from 
policymakers (except in relation to the Lloyd’s insurance mar-
ket where there were particular problems).  The prudential 
regulation and authorization of insurance companies were the 
responsibility of a government department under the Insurance 
  
 63. Julia Black & Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The 
Causes and Lessons of Regulatory Failure, 61 MOD. L. REV. 789, 789, 815 
(1998). 
 64. LARGE, supra note 50, at 8. 
 65. See, e.g., TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE, THE SIXTH REPORT, 
1995, cmt. 332, at vi. 
 66. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL, supra note 47, at 17 
(speech by Alistair Darling, the then Labour spokesman on the City).  See also  
Darling, supra note 46, at 172. 
 67. See generally JOHN BIRDS & NORMA J. HIRD, BIRDS, MODERN INSURANCE 
LAW ch. 2 (5th ed. 2001); JOHN P. LOWRY & PHILIP RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW: 
DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES 348–66 (1999); Darling, supra note 46. 
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Companies Act 1982.68  Long term insurance policies were 
treated as investments for the purposes of the Financial Ser-
vices Act 1986 with the result that these aspects of insurance 
companies’ business also fell within the scope of the regulatory 
regime established under that Act.69  Insurance brokers were 
also subject to another form of self-regulation within a statutory 
framework70 operated by a body known as the Insurance Bro-
kers Registration Council.  By the 1990s, the continuance of 
this degree of self-regulation was regarded as anomalous.71 The 
Lloyd’s insurance market had a special status under the Insur-
ance Companies Act 198272 and an exemption under the Finan-
cial Services Act 1986.73  Problems at Lloyd’s in the early 1990s 
resulting from disastrous losses put its special regulatory status 
under scrutiny.  Some observers suggested that by not being 
within the scope of the Financial Services Act 1986, Lloyd’s lost 
out on access to the latest standards and methods of regulation 
and that, if it had been better regulated, the impact of the 
losses might have been less severe.74  An internal review pub-
lished in early 1997 recommended that Lloyd’s should be 
  
 68. Insurance Companies Act, 1982 c. 50, § 3 (Eng.).  See also Richard 
Croly, The Regulatory Structure in the United Kingdom: The Role of the De-
partment of Trade and Industry, 1 INT’L INS. L. REV 349 (1993).  Responsibility 
for regulation of the insurance industry was assumed by another government 
department, HM Treasury, in 1997 as a prelude to its transfer to the Finan-
cial Services Authority.  Press Release, HM Treasury, Working Towards a 
Single Financial Regulator (July 30, 1998) available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/1998/press_127_98.cfm.  
 69. See generally GUIDE TO FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 370–86 (Barry 
A. K. Rider et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997). 
 70. Insurance Brokers Registration Act, 1977, c. 46 (Eng.) (repealed 2001). 
 71. ANDREW MCGEE, THE MODERN LAW OF INSURANCE  21 (2001); Richard 
Spiller, Insurance: Broker Regulation, 6 INT’L INS. L. REV N-67, at N-67 to N-
68 (1998). 
 72. Insurance Companies Act, 1982, c. 50, § 2(2)(a) (Eng.). 
 73. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, Pt. I, c. IV, § 42 (Eng.). 
 74. David Gittings, Lloyd’s of London: The Regulation of an International 
Insurance Market, 1 J. INT ’L FI N. MARKETS 72, 74–75 (1999); Darling, supra 
note 46, at 172.  The U.K. government’s oversight of the Lloyd’s insurance 
market during the 1980s is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the 
European Commission.  However, the investigation focuses more on whether 
the system of regulation has been improved by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, than on holding the U.K. to account for past mistakes.  
Andrew Osborn, Court Hopes Dented for Lloyd’s Names, GUARDIAN (London), 
Oct. 8, 2002, at 24.    
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brought within the regulatory jurisdiction of the SIB.75  The 
proposal was soon swept up into the radical new approach to 
financial regulation announced by the new Labour government 
in May 1997.  
D. All Change  
The new Labour government was elected on May 1, 1997.  On 
May 6, 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
announced that he was giving monetary policy independence to 
the Bank.76  This was followed on May 20 by a further an-
nouncement from the Chancellor, in which he announced the 
transfer of responsibility for banking regulation and supervi-
sion from the Bank of England to the SIB, as well as reform of 
the regulatory structure introduced by the Financial Services 
Act 1986.  According to the Chancellor:  “SIB will become the 
single regulator underpinned by statute.  The current system of 
self-regulation will be replaced by a new and fully statutory sys-
tem, which will put the public interest first, and increase public 
confidence in the system.” 77 The instigation of regulatory re-
form in itself was no surprise, but that it took the form of a 
switch to a single regulator was unexpected and politically con-
tentious,78 not least because the Governor of the Bank had not 
been consulted about the proposals to strip the Bank of its regu-
latory role.79  Previous statements from Labour Party spokes-
men had suggested more modest, incremental change concen-
  
 75. See Gittings, supra note 74, at 75. 
 76. Gordon Brown, Statement by the Chancellor on the Central Economic 
Objectives of the New Government (May 6, 1997), at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/speeches/statement/speech_ 
statement_index.cfm?  The background to this announcement and its conse-
quences are discussed generally in the House of Lords Select Committee Re-
port, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND REPORT, 1999, 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ 
ldmon/96/9601.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).  
 77. Gordon Brown, The Chancellor’s Statement to the House of Commons 
on the Bank of England (May 20, 1997), at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
Newsroom_and_Speeches/speeches/statement/speech_ 
statement_index.cfm? [hereinafter Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of 
England]. 
 78. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL, supra note 47, at 20–25.  
 79. On the political fallout of the decision, see ANDREW RAWNSLEY, 
SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE: THE INSIDE STORY OF NEW LABOUR 41–44 (2000). 
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trating, in particular, on dismantling the two-tier structure un-
der the Financial Services Act 1986.80   
According to the Chancellor’s statement, there were three key 
reasons for the new approach: (1) The existing system was fail-
ing to deliver the standards of investor protection and supervi-
sion that the industry and the public had the right to expect; (2) 
The two tier structure under the Financial Services Act 1986 
was inefficient, confusing, and lacked accountability and a clear 
allocation of responsibilities; and (3) The need for a regulatory 
structure that would reflect the nature of the markets where 
the old distinctions between banks, securities firms, and insur-
ance companies had become increasingly blurred.81  The first 
two reasons were predictable, given the local historical record. 
The third reason had not previously enjoyed the same degree of 
prominence.  Although matching the nature of the national 
regulator to the nature of the markets is now the familiar cen-
terpiece of discussions about the institutional framework of 
regulation, in the political debates on financial regulation in the 
U.K. in the 1990s it was not an issue that had attracted particu-
lar attention. 
So why was the single market/single regulator argument 
raised to such a prominent position by the British Chancellor?  
The full answer to this question may well remain unknown un-
til current political figures publish their memoirs or until confi-
dential political records are finally released. Mark Boléat, who 
was the then Director-General of the Association of British In-
surers, however, has put forward one plausible theory.  Boléat 
suggests that the decision to opt for a single regulator was 
driven more by pragmatic considerations relating to pressures 
on the parliamentary timetable than by principle: 
The Treasury team had failed to secure in the first Queen’s 
Speech legislation to abolish the two tier system under the Fi-
nancial Services and Markets Act.  However, a separate dec i-
sion had been taken to give the Bank of England independence 
in respect of conducting monetary policy and this did require 
legislation.  It seems that an opportunist decision was taken at 
this stage to move towards a single regulator because the leg-
islation to give the Bank of England independence in respect 
  
 80. Darling, supra note 46, at 172. 
 81. Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of England, supra note 77. 
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of monetary policy could be used for any other purpose rele-
vant to the Bank of England. 82 
Initial proposals were very sketchy and important industry sec-
tors, including, for a brief time, insurance,83 and, for a much 
longer time, mortgage lending,84 were not part of the remit 
originally envisaged for the new regulator.85 This credits the 
theory that the switch to a single regulator was a policy deci-
sion made “on the hoof” in response to political pressures un-
connected to the evolving nature of financial markets.86  An-
other theory that has also been suggested is that personal 
antagonism between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Governor of the Bank also played a part in driving the decision 
to divest the Governor of his institution’s regulatory powers.87 
For observers trying to discover what lessons can be learned 
from the U.K. experience in adopting the single regulator 
model, the clearest point that emerges from this brief historical 
survey up to 1997 is confirmation of the influence of intensely 
local, country-specific factors in decisions about institutional 
structures.  But May 1997 is too soon to leave the story.  Al-
though the decision itself may have been taken opportunisti-
  
 82. Mark Boléat, The New System of Financial Regulation, Speech at the 
London Insurance Institute (Nov. 25, 1998).  
 83. The inclusion of insurance in the new structure was announced in July 
1997.  Press Release, Department of Trade and Industry, Future Regulation of 
the Insurance Industry (July 23, 1997), available at http://www.newsrelease-
archive.net/coi/depts/GTI/coi1035d.ok. 
 84. JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS, DRAFT 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL: FIRST REPORT ¶ 84 (HL Paper 50-I, 
HC 328-I, 1999) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT], recommended 
that mortgages should be brought within the scope of the new regime.  In 
response, HM Treasury conducted a consultation exercise with the publication 
of HM  TREASURY, REGULATION OF MORTGAGES: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT BY HM  
TREASURY (July 20, 1999).  Following this consultation exercise, the decision 
was made to include mortgages, and power to extend the regime in this way 
was included in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.   However, so as 
not to over burden the FSA in its early days, its assumption of powers in rela-
tion to mortgage business was postponed.  The FSA currently expects to begin 
regulating mortgage lenders and advisers by mid-2004.  FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, TIMETABLE FOR THE REGULATION OF MORTGAGES AND GENERAL 
INSURANCE (2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/mort_gen_ins/mgi_ 
timetable.pdf.  
 85. See also Alcock, supra note 57, at 372, 375. 
 86. Id. 
 87. RAWNSLEY, supra note 79, at 41–44. 
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cally without full consideration of all of its implications, its an-
nouncement was a highly significant event.  It intensified de-
bate amongst theorists, inside and outside the U.K., about dif-
ferent institutional structures for financial regulation.88  At the 
same time, the challenges involved in turning the single regula-
tor model into practical reality soon became a major preoccupa-
tion for industry participants. 
III. PUTTING POLICY INTO EFFECT — CREATING A NATIONAL 
SINGLE REGULATOR 89 
The first stage in the reform process was the renaming of the 
SIB as the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in October 
1997.90  Thereafter, most of the existing regulatory agencies col-
lapsed themselves into the FSA structure on a largely informal 
and ad hoc basis.91  In effect, the FSA assumed the de facto role 
of single regulator.92  But for a transitional period ending on 
December 1, 2001, the FSA’s powers were mostly derived from 
the old legislation under which the previous fragmented re-
gimes had operated.93 One important exception was in the bank-
ing field, where regulatory and supervisory responsibilities 
were formally passed to the FSA in June 1998 under the Bank 
of England Act 1998.94  However, the 1998 Act merely trans-
ferred existing powers without significant amendment.  The 
FSA, as the renamed SIB, was, and still remains, in form, a 
company limited by guarantee.95 
  
 88. For a general survey see GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 142–88.  
 89 Lomnicka, supra note 19. 
 90. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT (1997), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp01.pdf, for a summary of ena-
bling legislation and background.  
 91. Howard Davies, Law and Regulation, 3 J. INT ’L FI N. MARKETS 169, 169 
(2001) [hereinafter Davies, Law and Regulation]. 
 92. Formally, the FSA acted as the sub-delegate of existing regulatory 
agencies.  See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT app. I 
(1997), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp01.pdf. 
 93. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/history (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2003). 
 94. Bank of England Act, 1998, § 3, sched. 4 (Eng.).  See also Davies, Law 
and Regulation, supra note 91, at 170; Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael 
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain 
and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 646 (1999). 
 95. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 13–14, 17 (Eng.). 
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The process of vesting full powers in the FSA as single regu-
lator began in July 1998 with the publication of the Financial 
Services and Markets Bill in draft form.96  A period of consulta-
tion with industry participants, consumer groups, and other 
interested parties followed.  The most significant part of the 
public consultation process was the establishment in February 
1999 of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to scru-
tinize the draft Bill — the first time a Joint Committee had 
been charged with this task.97  The Joint Committee, under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Burns, a former chief civil servant at HM 
Treasury (“Treasury”), opened paper submission on certain ma-
jor issues arising from the draft Bill.98  In addition, the Joint 
Committee held sessions of oral evidence.  The witnesses at 
these sessions included representatives from the government, 
the FSA, investment and commercial banks, insurers, consumer 
groups, and law firms.99  A novel feature of the oral evidence 
sessions was that they were run as discussions with fellow pan-
elists allowed to respond to each other's comments and sugges-
tions rather than just responding to questions from members of 
the Joint Committee.  To facilitate discussion, the head of the 
Treasury Bill team and the Deputy General Counsel of the FSA 
attended all of the sessions.100  The Joint Committee’s method of 
conducting its consultation process and the two reports which it 
produced at the end of its deliberations attracted widespread 
praise.101  The Joint Committee was thought to have clarified a 
number of key issues, in particular the impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the disciplinary and enforce-
ment procedures of the new regime.102  This issue was highly 
  
 96. Press Release, FSA, Publication of the Draft Bill (July 30, 1998). 
 97. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84. 
 98. Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Press Notice No. 
2 of Session 1998–99 (Mar. 10, 1999). 
 99. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 6, Minutes of Evi-
dence. 
 100. Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Press Notice No. 
3 of Session 1998–99 (Mar. 19, 1999); JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra 
note 84, ¶ 6. 
 101. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84.  See also JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS, DRAFT FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND MARKETS BILL, PARTS V, VI AND XII IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT (1999). 
 102. Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 170. 
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topical because the Human Rights Act 1998 was about to bring 
the Convention more fully into effect under British law. 103 
Although it achieved some notable successes, the Joint Com-
mittee sat only for a couple of months and, in the limited time 
period available, it was able to deal only with selected aspects of 
the new legislation.104  The debate then moved into the main 
chambers of both Houses of Parliament.  After a laborious and 
sometimes controversial passage through Parliament,105 the Bill 
finally received Royal Assent in June 2000.106  However the Fi-
nancial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) provides only 
the framework of the new regime.  The elaborate and extensive 
details of the regime are contained in secondary legislation, 
statutory instruments made by the Treasury, and in rules made 
by the FSA.107  The process of filling in the details occupied the 
period from Royal Assent until December 1, 2001 (a date known 
as “N2”), when the new regime finally came into effect.108   
Thus, although the FSA has been de facto operational in some 
form since 1997, it has enjoyed its full powers for only a rela-
tively brief period.  This creates an unusual situation.  On the 
one hand, the FSA has had time to establish itself and to begin 
to build its own identity and methods of operation.  Industry, 
consumers, and the media have had time to experience the real-
ity of dealing with the FSA as a quasi-single regulator and 
views have formed on how it is shaping up to the task.109  On 
  
 103. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
 104. See generally Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91; JOINT 
COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84. 
 105. According to The Sunday Telegraph: “[T]he Bill to set up the super 
regulator was one of the most tortuous pieces of legislation in Parliamentary 
history.”  Grant Ringshaw, Crackdown in the City Slapped Wrists or Heads on 
Spikes?, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 2001, at 5. 
 106. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8, Enactment Clause 
(Eng.). 
 107. See generally HM Treasury, Financial Services, at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services (last visited Feb. 19, 2003); FSA 
HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last modified Mar. 
3, 2003). 
 108. Press Release, Financial Services Authority, FSA Consults on Proposed 
Fees for New Regime (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/ 
2001/120.html; A Cut-Out-and-Keep Guide to the FSA, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 
1, 2001, at 35. 
 109. Howard Davies has described the situation in these terms: “[E]ven 
before it takes on its new powers, the FSA has acquired a reputation of sorts, 
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the other hand, views on the performance of the FSA as a single 
regulator must necessarily be qualified to take account of the 
fact that it has had its full powers for only a short period of 
time.  The distorting effect of the process of preparing for the 
new regime must also be considered.  The massive task of put-
ting in place the detailed aspects of the regime in the transi-
tional period between 1997 and 2001 undoubtedly diverted re-
sources and attention away from the task of practical delivery 
of regulation.  This means that it would clearly be premature to 
attempt to say whether the FSA is really delivering in practice 
the benefits claimed for a single regulator while avoiding the 
problems that this structure may create.  But the U.K.’s experi-
ence of living with a quasi-single regulator and, at the same 
time, making the transition to a formal single regulator is still 
worth examining further.  A remarkable combination of proc-
esses were occurring simultaneously: The development of theo-
retical arguments for and against a single regulator were evolv-
ing within the context of a market that was already waking up 
to the reality of living with a de facto single regulator, and all of 
these influences were feeding into the political processes 
through which the new regime was to acquire its legal basis and 
powers.110  The U.K. experience between 1997 and 2001 thus 
provides a valuable case study for testing theoretical arguments 
about the merits and drawbacks of the single regulator model 
and for demonstrating how those positive and negative features 
can be addressed in the legal framework by which the model is 
introduced.  
  
built on its performance as a caretaker, rather than as a principal.”  Davies, 
Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 169. 
 110. See, e.g., BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 6–9; Davies, Law 
and Regulation, supra note 91, at 169–70. 
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IV. HOW IS THE NEW REGIME SHAPING UP?  USING THE U.K. 
EXPERIENCE TO TEST AND EXAMINE THE LEGISLATIVE AND 
PRACTICAL RESPONSES TO THEORETICAL CONCERNS  
A. A Single Financial Regulator is Superior because it Mirrors 
the Nature of the Participants and Products in Financial Mar-
kets 
This is a prominent argument in favor of the single regulator 
model.111  The proposition that a single regulator is advanta-
geous because it mirrors the nature of modern financial mar-
kets, where old distinctions between different sectors and dif-
ferent products have broken down, certainly has logical superfi-
cial attraction.  However, some commentators have cautioned 
that the trend towards industry consolidation should not be ex-
aggerated.112  Although some firms are genuine financial su-
permarkets with major areas of activity in more than one of the 
main sectors of banking, securities, and insurance, many others 
remain dominated by their “core” business, despite some diver-
sification into other sectors.113  For such firms, the risk that 
concentration of regulatory responsibility will result in loss of 
regulatory diversity and valuable sector-specific knowledge and 
expertise, may not be counterbalanced in practice by a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of regulatory agencies with which 
they have to deal.  
Was the adoption of the single regulator model interpreted by 
market participants as simplification of regulation for major 
financial groups operating across sectors at the expense of more 
sector-specialized firms and institutions? Or was it viewed by 
consumer groups as a move driven by the demands of certain 
sections of the financial services industry for a system of regu-
lation that would be more convenient for them rather than for 
  
 111. See Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of England, supra note 77; 
BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE, supra note 8, at 12–17. 
 112. Alcock, supra note 57, at 376; GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153. 
 113. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153.  See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: 
Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 
254–55 (pointing out that the U.S. banking industry has separated into two 
sectors: the global sector involving a small group of very large banks providing 
the services of financial supermarkets; and the community sector comprising 
a few thousand smaller banks that provide personalized financial services to 
small businesses and moderately affluent customers).  
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the needs of consumers of financial services?  It appears not.  
According to a progress report published by the Treasury in 
March 1999, the single statutory regulator proposal had at-
tracted almost unanimous support.114  The influential Joint 
Committee on Financial Services and Markets supported the 
principle of a single regulator on the basis of the written and 
oral evidence presented to it.115  The proposal also attracted fa-
vorable comment from the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”).116  The comparative merits of alternative regulatory 
structures that had generated some debate117 were quickly side-
lined in the practical and political processes leading up to the 
adoption of the single regulator model in the U.K.118  
One key reason why there was no serious objection to the 
principle of the single regulator may have been that it had the 
great merit of simplicity.  Many of the failings, real or per-
ceived, of the predecessor regimes flowed from their inherent 
complexity.  The switch to a single regulator marked a decisive 
and radical break with the past.  Moreover, in political terms it 
was clear that adoption of the single regulator was “non-
negotiable” and that the Labour government’s large majority in 
Parliament would ensure the safe passage of the relevant legis-
lation.119  Pragmatically, it made no sense for lobbying groups to 
direct their efforts at challenging the basic idea of the single 
regulator since that battle was already lost.120  From the con-
  
 114. HM  TREASURY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL: PROGRESS 
REPORT ch. 2 (1999), available at http://finaserv02.uuhost.uk.uu.net/ 
development/legal/fsma/data/progress_report/progress_report.htm (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2002).  
 115. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 102. 
 116. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with the United Kingdom, IMF 
Pub. Info. Notice No. 99/17 (Mar. 7, 1999), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
sec/pn/1999/pn9917.htm.  
 117. See GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 12, at 142–88; MICHAEL TAYLOR, 
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (1995) [hereinafter TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS]; 
MICHAEL TAYLOR, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, PEAK 
PRACTICE: HOW TO REFORM THE U.K.’S REGULATORY SYSTEM (1996). 
 118. Howard Davies, Reforming Financial Regulation: Progress and Priori-
ties, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, supra note 48, at 19 [here-
inafter Davies, Reforming Financial Regulation]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Secondary battles about the scope of the regime, the powers of the sin-
gle regulator, and, in particular, the accountability of a single regulator were 
waiting to be fought.  See infra notes 145-243 and accompanying text. 
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sumer perspective, the new system offered the prospect of a 
“one stop shop” for complaints and redress via a unified finan-
cial services ombudsman, and that had strong appeal.121 
Does adoption of the single regulator model necessarily mean 
that regulation will actually operate seamlessly unimpeded by 
old sectoral boundaries?  In part, this question is unanswerable 
at this juncture because it involves an assessment that can only 
be made with the benefit of data arising from practical experi-
ence.  However, some observations arise from the processes 
leading up to the formal establishment of the FSA and relating 
to the arrangements as now in place.   
At the policy level, the FSA has made considerable efforts to 
establish its credentials as a single regulator in substance, as 
well as in form, by emphasizing its new integrated approach to 
regulation.122  It has adopted a single risk-based approach for 
use across all regulated sectors, markets, and firms.  In this 
context, “risk” has an unusual interpretation.123 It used to mean 
risk that the FSA will fail to achieve its statutory regulatory 
objectives.  The FSA’s standard risk assessment process in-
volves scoring the risk against a number of probability and im-
pact factors.124  The systemic nature of the firm is a relevant 
factor in the assessment process because maintaining confi-
dence in the financial system, which embraces systemic risk 
concerns, is one of the statutory objectives.125  However, the 
FSA has emphasized the “assessment of all risks has to be coor-
dinated, in order to gauge the overall threat to our objec-
tives.”126 
  
 121. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 282–96.  See Ferran, 
supra note 55, on the implementation of the unified ombudsman scheme and 
some early assessment of its performance.  
 122. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, A NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW 
MILLENNIUM 29 (2000), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/p29.pdf 
[hereinafter NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM]; FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, BUILDING THE NEW REGULATOR: PROGRESS REPORT 2, ¶¶ 59–63 
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/bnr_progress2.pdf. 
 123. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multi-Sectored Financial Ser-
vices Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 332–34 (1999) 
(Part II.A. discusses more common interpretations of “risk” in the context of 
financial regulation). 
 124. NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 122, at 15. 
 125. Id. at 15, 17. 
 126. Id. at 15. 
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The new risk-based approach to regulation is currently being 
phased in,127 so it is obviously too early to gauge whether the 
FSA has the organizational capacity to deliver an integrated 
regulatory approach.  The signs are good for those financial 
conglomerates that are regulated by the FSA’s Major Financial 
Groups Division, because that division has been established 
specifically to “take a coherent and integrated approach to the 
supervision of these groups.”128  An integrated approach is less 
obvious in other parts of the FSA’s internal departmental struc-
ture, which continue to be organized along broadly sectoral 
lines.129  The FSA lead regulator model — inherent in the 
predecessor regimes — is employed to deal with groups that 
operate predominantly in one sector but with some entities op-
erating in other sectors.130 This structure is sensible to the ex-
tent that, under the single regulator umbrella, it allows for sen-
sitive, differentiated regulation of businesses that are predomi-
nantly active only in one  sector.  In the transitional period, it 
may have facilitated smooth implementation of the single regu-
lator model because it allowed the staff employed in the previ-
ous fragmented structure to continue to work in their area of 
specialization which, in turn, gave comfort to regulated firms 
about continuity in practical, day-to-day relationships with 
  
 127. The fact that the FSA had not completed the rolling out of its risk 
based approach was at the center of its dispute with Fitch in June 2002 in 
which the FSA stated that Fitch’s report to the effect that 25% of the U.K.’s 
insurers had been placed in a higher risk category was a misinterpretation of 
FSA data.  Jill Treanor, Regulator Calls Fitch “Plain Wrong”: FSA Denies 
Insurers are “Higher Risk,” GUARDIAN (London), June 14, 2002, at 25. 
 128. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY , INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AUTHORITY 13 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ 
fsa_intro.pdf [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE  FSA].  A report commissioned 
by the Centre of the Study of Financial Innovation and published in May 2001 
indicated that the larger City institutions, particularly those classified as 
major financial groups, expected to see the greatest benefit of the single regu-
lator structure and that some already were.  See DAVID LASCELLES, CENTRE 
FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, WAKING UP TO THE FSA: HOW THE 
CITY V IEWS ITS NEW REGULATOR 13 (2001) [hereinafter CSFI, WAKING UP TO 
THE FSA]. 
 129. See INTRODUCTION TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 24 (FSA Organisa-
tion Chart). 
 130. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY , LEAD SUPERVISION : THE FSA’S NEW 
APPROACH TO THE CO-ORDINATION OF ITS SUPERVISION OF GROUPS 5 (1999), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/p19.pdf. 
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their regulators.131  But it could prove problematic in the longer 
term, if it facilitates the continuation of ingrained methods and 
practices that are, in principle, incompatible with the achieve-
ment of a truly integrated approach to regulation.  Here, again, 
there are some positive signs coming from FSA pronouncements 
about insurance regulation, which emphasize that risk-based 
assessment means a wholly new approach within its insurance 
division.132  However, it should be noted that the FSA is under 
particular pressure to signal a fresh start in insurance regula-
tion because of recent crises in the insurance sector involving 
both failing firms133 and defective products,134 for which the FSA 
  
 131. Alcock, supra note 57, at 377. 
 132. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY , THE FUTURE REGULATION OF 
INSURANCE : A PROGRESS REPORT (Oct. 2002) at 19, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/bnr_progress3.pdf; FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF INSURANCE (Nov. 2001), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/future-reg_insurance.pdf; Alex Brummer, 
Spotlight Falls on Insurance, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 4, 2001, at 67 (reporting the 
head of the FSA’s insurance side as taking the view that a whole new ap-
proach to insurance supervision based upon risk assessment is needed); 
Robert Preston, City Watchdog Who Bites but Won’t Bark, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Mar. 17, 2002 (reporting Howard Davies, the Chairman of the FSA, 
as identifying the imperative of modernizing insurance regulation, which was 
“a generation behind banking supervision and securities regulation”). 
 133. Equitable Life, the world’s oldest mutual life assurance company closed 
to new business in December 2000 following a court case, Equitable Life As-
surance Soc’y v. Hyman, [2002] 1 A.C. 408 (H.L.), in which the House of Lords 
ruled against the company in its interpretation of certain of its pension poli-
cies thereby plunging the company into extreme financial difficulties.  Inde-
pendent Insurance, a general insurance company, collapsed in June 2001 after 
the failure of efforts to raise additional capital.  These were headline-grabbing 
major collapses but according to FSA data, as of January 2002, thirty-nine 
general insurers were in formal insolvency proceedings in the U.K., with 
quantified gross insurance liabilities of £12.5 billion.  See generally Howard 
Davies, “Rational Expectations” — What Should the Market, and Policyhold-
ers, Expect from Insurance Regulation?, AIRMIC Annual Lecture (Jan. 29, 
2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp87.html. 
 134. In particular, the problem of mis-selling endowment policies, which 
surfaced in the late 1990s (i.e., life assurance policies which were sold in con-
junction with mortgages as a mechanism for repayment of mortgage principal 
at the end of its life but without clear disclosure to customers that there was 
no guarantee that the policies would in fact generate an amount sufficient to 
cover the mortgage debt).  According to the FSA, by 2000 an estimated 60% of 
the 11 million existing mortgages were no longer on track to repay the mort-
gage loan.  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PROGRESS REPORT ON MORTGAGE 
ENDOWMENTS  ¶ 2.18 (Oct., 2000), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
policy/p19.pdf.   
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has had to shoulder some blame135 as well as attracting signifi-
cant criticism from politicians and the media.136    
  
  Mis-selling allegations also surround another underperforming finan-
cial product — split capital trusts.  See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY , SPLIT 
CAPITAL CLOSED END FUNDS ¶¶ 5.11, 5.15 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp10.pdf; FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, SPLIT CAPITAL INVESTMENT TRUSTS (SPLITS) ¶ 3.7 (May 2002), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/pssplits/pdf; Ingrid Mansell, 
FSA Launches Investigation into Mis-selling of Splits, TIMES (London), May 
18, 2002, at 43.  
 135. The FSA’s internal audit of the regulator’s role in regulating Equitable 
Life between 1999 and 2000 identified deficiencies in FSA regulation, in par-
ticular with regard to communication between prudential and conduct of 
business regulators.  REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY ON THE 
REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY FROM 1 
JANUARY 1999 TO 8 DECEMBER 2000, WHICH HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IS 
SUBMITTING AS EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY LORD PENROSE ¶ 6.2.5  
(2001) [hereinafter BAIRD REPORT]; Press Release No. 57/01, Parliamentary 
Ombudsman to Investigate Financial Services Authority’s Handling of Equi-
table Life (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://ombudsman.org.uk/pca/press/ 
pn57-01.htm.  Following this report, the government established its own inde-
pendent inquiry.  See HM Treasury Press Release 113/01, Government Re-
sponse to FSA Report on the Regulation of Equitable Life, (Oct. 17, 2001), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/Press/ 
2001/Press_113.01.cfm.  The Parliamentary Ombudsman is also investigating 
the FSA’s handling of the collapse.  See James Moore, Ombudsman to Investi-
gate FSA Role at Equitable, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2001, at 24.  If the Om-
budsman finds the FSA guilty of maladministration, the government could be 
directed to compensate policyholders. 
  With regard to the Independent Insurance collapse, press reports indi-
cate that the FSA is to be sued by the company’s policyholders for its role in 
the handling of the collapse. Gary Parkinson, Independent Holders Sue FSA,  
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 13, 2002, at 38. 
 136. In relation to endowment mis-selling, the FSA was criticized in the 
press for not launching a full-scale review akin to that which had been con-
ducted previously in relation to pensions mis-selling.  In some quarters this 
was interpreted as the FSA bowing to industry pressure rather than champi-
oning consumer interests.  The FSA’s attempts to diffuse the situation by 
publishing guidance to firms on dealing with endowment-related complaints 
and making redress to those with legitimate claims did not stem the flow of 
critical press coverage.  See, e.g., David Prosser & Neasa MacErlean, Cash: 
Where’s the Rest?: The Endowment Crisis Has Hit Millions Yet Regulators 
Refuse a Full Review, OBSERVER, Sept. 2, 2001, at 2.  Findings from a year-
long FSA review of the profits industry were also criticized by consumer 
groups, with suggestions that the FSA had kowtowed to industry in its rec-
ommendations.  Emma Simon, The Great With-profits Fudge: The FSA’s Re-
port on its Investigation, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, June 2, 2002, at 4. 
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The flip-side of the argument that a single regulator will fail 
in practice to deliver an integrated regulatory approach, is that 
it will pursue integration over-enthusiastically thereby failing 
to make appropriate differentiation between businesses that 
mainly operate in different sectors, or between businesses 
within the same sector but which have very different customer 
bases.  A single regulator is obviously vulnerable to attack on 
this ground but, thus far, criticism of the FSA on the ground 
that it is attempting to impose a “one-size-fits-all” approach has 
been muted.137  The FSA has helped its own cause in this re-
spect by explicitly introducing a differentiated regime, which 
uses the nature of the counterparty with whom a firm deals as 
the basis for determining the applicable level of conduct for 
business regulation.138  This approach allows for “light touch” 
regulation of business between market professionals.139  It has 
been welcomed as restoring “some of the differentiation that 
was inherent in the City’s old regime.”140 
B. A Single Regulator Should Be Able to Deliver Efficiency 
Gains 
There are several strands to the argument that the single 
regulator model may be superior to alternative regulatory 
structures on efficiency grounds.141  Efficiency in this context 
  
 137. See CSFI, WAKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 4, 14–15 (report-
ing some fears about the growth of a mono-culture and excessive zeal for har-
monization but suggesting that any loss in regulatory diversity has been offset 
by greater consistency). 
 138. FSA HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last 
modified Mar. 3, 2003); Market Conduct Sourcebook available at 
www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook/legal_instruments/2001/jun21_mar.pdf (last modi-
fied Sept. 24, 2002); The Inter-Professionals Code (FSA Consultation Paper 
47, 2002) available at www.fsa.gov.UK/pubs/CP/47 (last modified July 25, 
2002). 
 139. Edward Black & Emma Radmore, CP47 — The Inter-professionals 
Code, 1 FIN. SERVICES BULL. 11 (2000).  
 140. CSFI, WAKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 15. 
 141. See generally BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 18–22; CLIVE 
BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATOR 14–15, 27–31 (FSA Occasional Paper No. 16, 2002), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/index-2002.html [hereinaf-
ter BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE]; Leonardo Bartolini, The Financial 
Services Authority: Structure, Mandate and Policy Issues, in HOSSEIN SAMIEI 
 
File: FERRAN Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  4/2/2003 1:23 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
284 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
relates to the manner in which the regulator deploys its own 
internal resources.142  This is closely linked to the efficiency of 
its regulation and supervision, which relates to the wider eco-
nomic impact of its activities, including compliance costs for 
regulated firms.143   
A single regulator’s position allows it to look across the entire 
financial industry and devote regulatory resources to where 
they are most needed.  These include human, as well as finan-
cial, resources: the single regulator model should facilitate effi-
cient use of available expertise and experience, a factor that 
may be particularly significant where such expertise and ex-
perience are in short supply.  Economies of scale and scope 
should be possible because the single regulator has a unified 
management structure; can take advantage of unified central 
support services; introduce single databases and reporting sys-
tems; develop a single set of rules; and adopt consistent policies 
that are informed by its ability to take a market or industry-
wide perspective.144  A single regulator should, in principle, be 
able to avoid wasteful duplication and overlap.  Economic lit-
erature, however, provides plenty of evidence to support 
counter-arguments about the economics of scale offered by 
mega-regulators.145  It is also pointed out in the literature that 
the direct cost savings available by having a single institutional 
infrastructure, may be “a comparatively small proportion of the 
total costs of regulation.”146   With regard to the compliance cost 
burden on regulated firms, in principle, firms may gain from 
having to deal with only one regulator and one set of require-
ments.  This is not guaranteed however, because a single regu-
lator’s regime might prove to be more burdensome than the 
combined weight of the applicable parts of a fragmented regime.  
The FSA is funded entirely by industry levy.147  With that in 
mind, it is unsurprising that the likely efficiency of the new re-
gime was a major concern for industry participants in the pe-
  
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE  (IMF 
Staff Country Report No. 99/44, 1999). 
 142. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 103. 
 143. Id. 
 144. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 151–52. 
 145. For a summary, see GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 12, at 152–55.  See 
also Mwenda & Fleming, supra note 1, at 3, 11. 
 146. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 152. 
 147. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 12(6) (Eng.).  
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riod leading up the passing of FSMA.  Politically, these were 
concerns that needed to be explicitly addressed in order to re-
tain industry confidence.  Accordingly, clear provisions relating 
to efficiency were built into the legislative framework.148  In dis-
charging its general functions, the FSA must have regard to a 
series of statutory regulatory principles, the first-listed of which 
is “the need to use its resources in the most efficient and eco-
nomic way.”149  Another of these principles is that burdens im-
posed must be “proportionate to the benefits . . . which are ex-
pected to result from the imposition.”150  This “proportionality 
principle” provides a measure against which the FSA must 
judge whether the costs of regulatory compliance that it im-
poses on an industry are justifiable.151  It is supplemented by 
specific procedural obligations on the FSA to do, and to publish, 
cost-benefit analysis as part of the process of consultation be-
fore it exercises certain of its lawmaking powers.152  The legal 
obligation of the FSA to be mindful of the need to run an effi-
cient and economic regulatory regime is further reinforced by 
other statutory regulatory principles that require it to consider, 
first, “the international character” of the financial industry and 
the desirability of maintaining the U.K.’s competitive position 
and, second, “the need to minimize the adverse effects [of its 
activities] on competition.”153  
The FSMA gives the government power to commission and 
publish independent value for money audits of the FSA.154  
However, calls for the National Audit Office to have a direct 
  
 148. Id. § 2(2)–(3). 
 149. Id. § 2(3)(a). 
 150. Id. § 2(3)(c). 
 151. Id. § 4(2)(a). 
 152. In particular, its general rulemaking powers under Financial Services 
and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 155(1)(2)(a) (Eng.).  Whether meaningful cost 
benefit analysis can actually be achieved by the FSA is an issue that divides 
commentators.  Compare ISAAC ALFON & PETER ANDREWS, COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION — HOW TO DO IT AND HOW IT ADDS VALUE 
(FSA Occasional Paper No. 3, 1999), with Charles A. E. Goodhart, Regulating 
the Regulator — An Economist’s Perspective on Accountability and Control, in 
REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 48, at 151, 156–57.  
See also DAVID SIMPSON ET AL ., SOME COST BENEFIT ISSUES IN FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (FSA Occasional Paper No. 12, 2000), available at  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/op12.pdf.  
 153. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2(3)(e)–(f) (Eng.).  
 154. Id. § 12.  
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role in relation to the FSA were resisted.155  As a company, the 
FSA is subject to requirements of the companies’ legislation 
with regard to the publication of its annual report and ac-
counts.156  In addition, under the FSMA it must further make 
an annual report to the Treasury.157 
To date, how is the FSA’s performance measuring up on effi-
ciency and broader economic grounds?  The risk-based approach 
to regulation is the core of the FSA’s strategy for achieving 
regulatory efficiency.  The Chairman of the FSA has claimed 
that: “It has already led to some significant shifts of resources 
within the Authority, and to a change of emphasis in line su-
pervisory divisions, towards pro-active work intended to head 
off emerging risks, and away from routine, box-checking exer-
cises focused on mechanical compliance with rule-based re-
quirements.” 158 
The allocation of additional resources to upgrade insurance 
regulation is the most obvious shift that has taken place.  This 
extra allocation has been achieved by diverting resources out of 
banking supervision on the basis that banking business appears 
to pose far fewer risks than insurance business.159  This ap-
proach to the allocation of resources does raise the specter of 
the FSA being prone to shifting its resources around in re-
sponse to short-term political pressures — insurance is cer-
tainly the obvious current weak link in the regulatory frame-
work but it was not that long ago when banking regulation was 
in the spotlight as the problem area in the aftermath of various 
bank failures.  However, only time will tell whether this is a 
real problem. 
To date, the FSA has done a reasonable job in keeping its own 
costs under control.  According to an FSA comparative study of 
the direct costs of regulation, the U.K. ranked second most in-
expensive, behind Sweden (another single regulator country), 
with United States (“U.S.”) regulatory costs being some eight-
  
 155. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 108–11. 
 156. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 10(1), 13, sched. 1 
(Eng.). 
 157. Id. § 10.  
 158. Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 172. 
 159. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PLAN AND BUDGET 2002/2003, at 5 
(2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/pb2002_03.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PLAN AND BUDGET 2002/03].  
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een times greater than those in the U.K.160 However, there are 
concerns that the FSA has only achieved this position at the 
expense of regulated firms, which have faced a sharp increase 
in compliance costs,161 while the brunt of increased compliance 
costs have been borne disproportionately by smaller firms.162  
Addressing the issue of compliance costs, FSA Chairman How-
ard Davies has spoken of the aim of the new regime as being to 
“reduce the overall costs of regulation, especially for well-
managed firms.”163  While an increase in compliance costs as 
industry adapted to the new regime was only to be expected, in 
the longer term, if the position falls far short of Davies’ aim, 
this would be a major source of industry dissatisfaction.  At 
worst, it could result in firms engaging in “regulatory arbitrage” 
and shifting their regulatory base to a lower cost jurisdiction.164  
If that were to happen, the FSA would have difficulty convinc-
ing observers that it has properly observed the statutory regu-
latory principles on competitiveness within an international 
market to which it is supposed to have regard.  
Studies on whether the FSA has realized its potential in de-
ploying human resources more efficiently may be forthcoming.  
Presently, the main concern relating to the FSA’s human re-
sources is whether it can attract, and retain in overall terms, a 
sufficient number of well-qualified staff because of the large 
  
 160. Howard Davies, N2 Plus 3, Speech at the Worshipful Company of 
Chartered Secretaries & Administrators Annual Lecture (Mar. 5, 2002), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp93.html [hereinafter Da-
vies, N2 Plus 3].   For further analysis, see FSA, ANNUAL REPORT app. 10 at 
133–38 (2001/2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar01 
_02.pdf; FSA, ANNUAL REPORT app. 5 at 79–83 (2000/2001), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar00_01.pdf. 
 161. Using the definition of compliance costs offered by ALFON & ANDREWS, 
supra note 152, at 16, as being: the costs to firms and individuals of those 
activities required by regulators that would not have been undertaken in the 
absence of regulation.  Davies notes that extensive comparative data on the 
total costs of regulation is not available and that such data as exists is some-
what impressionistic.  Davies, N2 Plus 3, supra note 160.  See also Graham 
Bannock, Financial Services Regulation: Controlling the Costs, 6 FIN. REG. 31, 
32–33 (2002).  
 162. DAVID LASCELLES, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS , 
HOW THE CITY V IEWS ITS NEW REGULATOR  17–19 (2001); Michael Becket, FSA 
Red Tape “Hits Small Businesses,” DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 18, 2001, 
at 34. 
 163. PLAN AND BUDGET 2002/03, supra note 159.  
 164. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 52–53. 
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disparity in pay levels between the private and public sectors.165 
Although the FSA has attracted some leading figures from the 
professions into top-level positions,166 this is not necessarily in-
dicative of success at all levels within its staffing structure.  
Senior people who have already fulfilled many of their career 
ambitions within the private sector are likely already to have 
achieved a level of financial security that allows them to con-
sider a lifestyle change and/or enables them to appreciate the 
opportunity to contribute to policy development in areas with 
strong public interest implications.167   Young, ambitious, and 
skilled lawyers, accountants, economists, and other profession-
als who would be suited to careers in regulation, however, may 
not (yet) have the luxury of financial security.  Furthermore, 
from their perspective, there is a particular disadvantage that 
flows directly from the streamlined, unified structure of a single 
regulator.  Put simply, if the management system is unified 
then there are fewer top positions to which they can aspire.  On 
the other hand, it may be argued that this narrowing of oppor-
tunity at the very top is counter-balanced by the greater power, 
influence, and prestige that should attach to senior positions 
below the very top level in an agency that is responsible for 
regulating an entire industry, than to positions of an equivalent 
level within a fragmented regulatory structure.  The impact of 
the narrowing of career opportunities that may result from the 
adoption of the single regulator model, and the possible coun-
terbalancing effect of the enhancement in the quality of certain 
positions just below the very top level, are issues that, to date, 
  
 165. This was a concern for the Joint Committee.  Id. ¶¶ 249–53.  There 
continue to be newspaper reports about the FSA’s difficulties in retaining 
staff.  See, e.g., Chris Hughes, FSA Aims to Stem Staff Exodus with 7.4% Pay 
Rise, INDEP., Feb. 1, 2002, at 21.  
 166. In particular, the FSA has recruited a small team of senior executives 
recently retired from banks and insurance companies (the “grey panthers”) to 
keep in touch with the markets and advise the FSA staff on transactions.  
Katherine Griffiths, FSA “Grey Panthers” to Hunt for Failures, INDEP., Dec. 
4, 2001, at 17.  
 167. For example, John Tiner, now a managing director at the FSA, was 
recruited from the private sector (Arthur Andersen) in 2001 with a reported 
drop of £750,000 in salary.  Tiner has been quoted as explaining his switch on 
the grounds that it gave him the opportunity to help shape a national indus-
try: “I’ve always known I would go into public service.”   William Kay, The 
Head of the FSA is a Man with a Mission to Succeed. But at What?, INDEP., 
May 25, 2002, at 2.  
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have attracted little attention but they may merit closer exami-
nation. 
Spending time at the FSA at an early stage in one’s career 
might be attractive to young, skilled professionals if that were 
to be seen as an especially good route into a lucrative career in 
the private sector.  Although the practice of people building ca-
reers in the financial industry in this way is not as well-
established in the U.K. as it is assumed to be in the U.S.,168 
there are growing indications of FSA experience being used as a 
springboard from which to launch a more lucrative private sec-
tor career.169  Therefore, there may be an increasing trend to-
wards this pattern of career development.  Such a trend could 
benefit the FSA because it could increase the size and quality of 
the human resources available to it.  However, there are also 
potential drawbacks in that it could encourage industry capture 
because junior regulators might be tempted to adopt lax prac-
tices with regard to the firms for which they are responsible in 
order to enhance their own career opportunities.  High turnover 
of junior-level FSA staff could also prove costly for regulated 
firms since they would, in effect, have to absorb costs involved 
in dealing with inexperienced and untested regulators.  
Generally speaking, although still a nascent organization, the 
FSA regime does not show signs of having been captured by 
industry.  Criticisms from industry that the FSA is too con-
sumer-orientated170 and criticisms from consumer groups that 
the FSA is too pro-industry, 171 largely balance each other out, 
which overall, might be thought to be a reasonable state of af-
fairs.172  The FSA regime has broadly retained the confidence of 
both industry and consumer associations.  Its success in this 
respect is widely attributed to the FSA’s first Chairman, How-
  
 168. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 252.  
 169. See Hughes, supra note 165.  
 170. For example, Mary Francis, Director-General of the Association of Brit-
ish Insurers, has been quoted as describing the FSA as “the provisional wing 
of the Consumers’ Association.”  Liam Halligan, The FSA Must Put Its Own 
House in Order, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 29, 2001, at 4.  
 171. Particularly with regard to its stance on endowment mortgages and the 
for profits industry more generally.  See supra notes 134–37.  
 172. See, e.g., Chris Hughes, Three Years On, the FSA Finds Itself Under 
Attack From All Sides, INDEP., July 20, 2001, at 21. 
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ard Davies, who is thought to have had a benign influence on 
the character of the new regime.173  
C. The Single Regulator Model May Provide a More Effective 
System of Regulation 
Effectiveness is measured by whether a regulatory system 
achieves its objectives.174  Effectiveness overlaps with suitability 
— a single regulator may be more effective than alternative 
regulatory models because its structure is better suited to the 
increasingly integrated nature of financial markets.  Employing 
current popular jargon, the single regulator is likely to be effec-
tive because it has a full regulatory “toolkit” at its disposal and 
is thus ideally placed to select the optimal regulatory responses 
to any situation.175  Effectiveness also overlaps with efficiency 
because inefficient regulation is likely to produce results that 
are inimical to a properly effective system of regulation.  
An argument that merits separate attention is that a single 
regulator may be more effective because of the coherence and 
clarity of its mandate.  Lack of coherence and clarity about 
what an agency is supposed to do would be a major weakness of 
any regulatory system, whether it involves a single regulator or 
several agencies.176  But a particular argument for the superior-
ity of the single regulator model in this respect is that the single 
regulator may be ideally positioned to maintain coherence and 
clarity of purpose because its unified management structure 
provides an effective mechanism for resolution of conflicts be-
tween different regulatory objectives.177   However, commenta-
tors are sharply divided on this alleged benefit.  Charles Good-
hart and his co-authors suggest that a single regulator may lack 
  
 173. George Trefgarne, When the FSA Pulls the Strings . . . There is a Ref-
uge from Sir Howard Davies’s Red Tape, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2001, at 
35. 
 174. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 103. 
 175. NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 122, at 25–32 
(Chapter 3 outlines the FSA’s regulatory tools and considers how they may be 
used in practice). 
 176. Alan Page, Regulating the Regulator — A Lawyer’s Perspective on Ac-
countability and Control, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra 
note 48, at 127. 
 177. BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE, supra note 8, at 7, 21. 
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“a clear focus on the objectives and rationale of regulation.”178  
So instead of facilitating coherence and clarity, the single regu-
lator model may result in self-contradiction and confusion.  Mi-
chael Taylor argues that, rather than being a benefit, the ability 
of a single regulator to resolve disputes about objectives inter-
nally is an undesirable feature because such disputes should be 
resolved at the political level due to their public policy implica-
tions.179  Alternative regulatory models have been put forward 
by these authors, in which regulatory responsibilities are di-
vided between agencies by reference to different regulatory ob-
jectives.180 
Another theoretical argument for the greater effectiveness of 
the single regulator model is with regard to consistency, com-
munication, and cooperation at operational levels.181 Individual 
regulators may find it easier to communicate and cooperate 
with each other on matters of common concern when they all 
work for the same organization rather than when they are scat-
tered between different agencies. Moreover, they should all 
have a shared cultural approach to their task and operate con-
sistently in accordance with the common policies set at man-
agement level.182  However, success is not guaranteed. Whether 
these potential gains are realized is obviously dependent on 
how well separate, specialized divisions within the single regu-
lator actually do cooperate and communicate with each other, 
and how effectively a consistent cultural approach has perme-
ated throughout the organization.183  
Law can play a key role in providing a clear and authoritative 
statement of objectives and in providing an agency with powers 
to enable it to operate in a consistent manner. The value of es-
tablishing a legal framework specifically designed to support 
the effectiveness of the single regulator model was recognized in 
the U.K.  The “easy” option of simply piecing together the exist-
ing sectorally-based legal regimes and vesting all of those exist-
  
 178. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153.  See also  DANIEL GROS & KAREL 
LANNOO, THE EURO CAPITAL MARKET 146–47 (1999) (arguing that regulation 
by objective could result in excessive regulation of wholesale business because 
of misplaced concerns about consumer protection). 
 179. TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS , supra note 117. 
 180. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 156. 
 181. See BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE, supra note 8, at 17–19 
 182. Id. 
 183. GROS & LANNOO, supra note 178, at 145.  
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ing powers in the FSA was ruled out in favor of the much more 
ambitious approach of providing a fully integrated common le-
gal framework.184  Thus, the FSMA gives the FSA broad powers 
to regulate across the financial sector.  The Act also deepens the 
regulatory regime in key respects including, in particular and 
most controversially, a new market abuse regime that allows 
the FSA to impose civil penalties on any person — not just 
those within the regulated financial industry — who has en-
gaged in abusive conduct.185 
The cornerstone of the FSMA is the statement of regulatory 
objectives, which are: maintaining confidence in the financial 
system; promoting public understanding of the financial sys-
tem; securing the appropriate degree of protection for consum-
ers; and reducing financial crime.186  The FSA is under a statu-
tory duty in discharging its general functions to act in a way 
that is compatible with the regulatory objectives, but only so far 
as is “reasonably possible.”187  Subject to the same qualification, 
in the discharge of its general functions the FSA is also re-
quired to act in a way that it “considers most appropriate for 
the purpose of meeting those objectives.”188  These duties are 
supplemented by the obligation to consider specified regulatory 
principles, as previously discussed.189 
The inclusion of a statement of regulatory objectives in the 
FSMA was generally welcomed during the passage of the legis-
lation, although there was, inevitably, some discussion about 
whether the right objectives had been specified190  as well as a 
more technical legal debate about the drafting of the relevant 
provisions.191  The statutory statement of objectives represents 
a brave attempt to distill the purposes of regulation across sec-
  
 184. Prior to December 2001, the overhaul was not so radical at the second-
tier level (i.e., in the rules made by the FSA itself).  There, the emphasis was 
on changes necessary to achieve consistency and simplification, rather than 
on re-assessment of fundamental principles.  Davies, Law and Regulation, 
supra note 91, at 169. 
 185. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. VIII (Eng.). 
 186. Id. at pt. I, §§ 3–6. 
 187. Id. at pt. I, § 2. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.  
 190. In particular whether there should have been a further objective, also 
requiring the FSA to promote competition. 
 191. See JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 18–62 (provid-
ing a helpful summary of the main aspects of the debate).  
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tors that traditionally may have had different focuses.192 But 
whether this statement, supplemented by the regulatory prin-
ciples, actually gives the FSA a clear idea of its purpose and 
provides it with a workable basis on which to build a coherent 
and consistent system of effective financial regulation, are ma-
jor questions that will be best examined through the lens of 
practical experience.  At this stage  it would seem sensible to 
have low expectations — the breadth of the objectives and the 
FSA’s wide discretion with regard to their implementation, may 
mean that the objectives will prove to have limited value in 
pinpointing exactly what it is that the FSA is supposed to do 
and, accordingly, whether it has achieved its mandate.   
A key set of issues will be those relating to the objective of 
maintaining confidence in the financial system and how the 
FSA’s role in this respect relates to the Bank’s continuing re-
sponsibility for the overall stability of the financial system, es-
pecially the stability of the monetary and payment financial 
systems.193  Will this arrangement prove to be robust in dealing 
with systemic risks or will the U.K. model validate those who 
argue that the ability of a central bank to perform its role as 
overseer of the financial system is undermined if it is not also 
the regulator of banks and other institutions that present sys-
temic concerns?194  For now, these are largely questions for the 
  
 192. Jackson, supra note 123, at 339–63  (Pt. III explores cross-sectoral 
variation in U.S. financial regulation). 
 193. A memorandum of understanding between the FSA, the Bank of Eng-
land and HM Treasury sets out their respective obligations with regard to 
financial regulation, details arrangements for Bank of England access to FSA 
supervisory records and sets outs procedures, in the form of monthly meet-
ings, for cooperation between them.  See Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA (Oct. 28, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Documents/Financial_ 
Services/Regulating_Financial_Services/fin_rfs_mou.cfm. 
 194. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS IN 
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 7 (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/ 
prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf [hereinafter ECB, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS] 
(providing a recent restatement of the case for preservation of a fundamental 
role in prudential supervision for national central banks, with particular ref-
erence to the eurosystem). See generally Leonardo Bartolini, The Financial 
Services Authority: Structure, Mandate and Policy Issues, in HOSSEIN SAMIEI 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND : UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE (IMF 
Staff Country Report No. 99/44, 1999); GROS & LANNOO, supra note 178, at 
140–43. 
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future,195 but it is interesting to note that some of those within 
the U.K.’s financial industry who welcomed the original concept 
of the single regulator in the U.K. are now beginning to revisit 
the issue precisely because of concerns about the allocation of 
responsibilities between the Bank and the FSA.196  The merits 
of the U.K. approach with regard to the allocation of responsi-
bilities for financial stability have also been doubted by the 
European Central Bank.197 
The FSA has made an inauspicious start concerning claims 
about the superiority of the single regulator model on the 
grounds of greater consistency in institutional approach and 
shorter and simpler lines of communication and cooperation 
between individual regulators.  An FSA internal report on its 
handling of the crisis affecting a major insurance company in 
1999 and 2000 specifically identified poor communication be-
tween regulators working within different departments of the 
FSA as a deficiency in regulation.198  To date, this remains the 
most prominent and embarrassing example of the FSA failing 
to live up to its potential as an effective single regulator; how-
ever, there have been others.  A more recent example is the 
criticism by influential bodies within the banking sector of the 
FSA’s proposed prudential rules that, in their view, showed all 
  
 195. BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 14–15, 27–31 
(considering the practical operation of this arrangement).  Briault suggests 
that the tripartite arrangement between the Bank, the FSA, and the Treasury 
works well, although he acknowledges that “the arrangements have not yet 
been put to the test in a period of massive financial instability, or of the ‘fail-
ure’ of a firm (or firms) posing a significant systemic risk.”   Id. at 15.  Others 
are more skeptical: “The memorandum created the impression they were 
working together fine, but there’s still competition and jealousy of each other’s 
turf.  The Bank still considers itself to have some residual authority over the 
FSA.”  Faisal Islam, One of our Governors is Missing: But is the Treasury 
Looking in the Wrong Place to Fill the Bank of England Job?, OBSERVER, Sept. 
1, 2002, at 5 (quoting Kern Alexander, Senior Fellow in International Law at 
the Judge Institute, Cambridge). 
 196. Views of Ian Mullen, Chief Executive of the British Bankers’ Associa-
tion (“BBA”), as reported in BBA’s Unhelpful Criticism Of Financial Services 
Authority — A Recent Speech By The Head of the British Bankers’ Association, 
In Which He Lambasted The UK’s Financial Services Authority, Is Unfair On 
The Super-regulator, BANKER, June 1, 2002. 
 197. See generally EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS  
IN PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/ 
prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf.  
 198. BAIRD REPORT, supra note 135, ¶ 6.2.5. 
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the signs of having been drafted by specialist teams with no one 
taking overall responsibility to ensure a coherent and consistent 
approach.199  In the short term, the FSA can use its youthful 
status and inexperience as a single regulator as an excuse for 
this type of regulatory shortcoming, but explanations of that 
sort will become less convincing as the regime matures.  
D. A Single Regulator May be More/Less Accountable 
In its simplest terms, the argument for a single regulator 
case on accountability grounds is that a single regulator has no 
other regulatory body to which it can transfer blame for regula-
tory failure.200  It is suggested that the fact that “the buck stops 
here” provides the regulator with a strong incentive to establish 
a clear mandate, to stick to it in its practical operations, and to 
educate consumers of financial services on what protections 
they can and cannot reasonably expect from the regulatory sys-
tem.201  These features are connected with accountability be-
cause the more clearly the regulator’s mandate and areas of 
responsibility are defined, the easier it should be for those who 
are affected by its operations to hold it accountable.202  How-
ever, commentators also identify major concerns about account-
ability in relation to single regulators because of the all-
embracing nature of their role and their concentrated and po-
tentially draconian powers.203  Can a single regulator be made 
properly accountable to an industry while avoiding regulatory 
capture?  Can it be made properly accountable to consumers 
without creating false perceptions and possible moral hazard 
concerns about the extent to which the regulatory system will 
protect them from financial risks?  If the single regulator is in-
dependent of government, as is the case in the U.K., by what 
mechanisms can it be held politically accountable in respect of 
  
 199. See Press Release, British Bankers’ Ass’n, BBA/LIBA Response to Con-
sultation Paper 97 — The Integrated Prudential Sourcebook (Jan. 17, 2002), 
available at http://www.bba.org.uk/public/newsroom/35451/42733/45188? 
version=1. 
 200. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 152; Chris Hughes, The Buck Stops 
Here, INDEP., Oct. 3, 2001, at 1. 
 201. GOODHART ET AL, supra note 12, at 151–52 
 202. LARGE, supra note 50, at 82; JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra  
note 84, ¶¶ 99–146; ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY , STRATEGY , PRACTICE ch. 21 (1999). 
 203. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153–54. 
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its public interest functions?  These questions are much debated 
in the literature on regulation and the arguments are often 
finely balanced.  They were also major preoccupations in the 
public debate in the U.K. leading up to the adoption of the sin-
gle regulator model.    
Industry lobbying groups made extensive use of a nightmar-
ish vision of the FSA as an over-mighty, over-powerful bully in 
their efforts to influence the content of the legislative frame-
work from which it would derive its powers.204  Particularly, in 
relation to its disciplinary and enforcement powers, lurid im-
ages of the FSA as legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury, and execu-
tioner all rolled into one were frequently invoked.205  The 
FSMA, as finally enacted, does give the FSA very extensive 
powers, but there are also broad legislative control mechanisms 
which are intended to act as checks and balances against the 
FSA in the use of these powers.   
The regulatory objectives and principles lie at the core of the 
accountability mechanisms.  They are relevant to public ac-
countability (i.e. accountability to industry and consumers), po-
litical accountability, and judicial accountability since they pro-
vide all interested parties with benchmarks against which to 
judge the FSA’s performance.  While the statutory statement of 
objectives and principles is broadly welcome as an improvement 
to the accountability framework, some of the more optimistic 
statements about the significance of the objectives and princi-
ples need to be viewed with care.  For example, it has been sug-
gested that the regulatory objectives and principles provide the 
basis for legal accountability because “the FSA could be chal-
lenged in the courts on the grounds that it has failed to pursue 
its objectives or to take the principles into account.”206  While 
this statement is certainly true, cases where legal challenges 
against the FSA on these grounds actually succeed are likely to 
be rare.  This is because the FSMA gives the FSA considerable 
discretion as to how best to meet its objectives.  Its duty to act 
in a way that is compatible with the objectives and, for the pur-
pose of meeting them, extends only “so far as is reasonably pos-
  
 204. See Gary Parkinson, FSA Bows to Criticisms of Being Judge and Jury 
in Enforcement Regime, MONEY MARKETING, July 8, 1999, at 2. 
 205. Dan Atkinson, “Judge, Jury and Executioner” Claims Defeat City Su-
per-regulator, GUARDIAN, July 6, 1999, at 22; Parkinson, supra note 204, at 2. 
 206. BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 12. 
File: FERRAN Base Macro Final.doc Created on: 4/2/2003 1:23 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM 
2003] U.K.’S SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR 297 
sible.”207  It is for the FSA itself to decide on the “most appropri-
ate” way in which to meet the objectives.208  Further, the obliga-
tions of the FSA with regard to the objectives only arise in rela-
tion to its “general functions” — its functions in making rules, 
issuing codes, and giving general guidance considered as a 
whole and its function of determining general policy and princi-
ples.209  Similarly, the FSA is only required to “have regard” to 
the regulatory principles and, as with the objectives, this duty 
only arises in relation to the discharge of its general func-
tions.210  This careful drafting ensures that there is no mecha-
nism for challenging individual rules or decisions on the 
grounds that they are incompatible with the objectives or prin-
ciples.  The qualified and self-referential nature of the duties 
regarding the regulatory objectives and principles appears 
likely to hamper the effectiveness of judicial review in practice.   
Similar caution is appropriate at this stage in relation to 
other, more detailed, accountability mechanisms provided for in 
relation to the FSA because they have only been fully operative 
for a short period of time.  Some important aspects are largely 
untested.  For example the Financial Services and Markets Tri-
bunal (“Tribunal”), which is an independent review body to 
which certain FSA decisions can be referred, has not yet heard 
a case through to completion. The provisions for the Tribunal in 
the legislative framework211 are intended to assuage concerns 
about the all-embracing role of the FSA as judge, jury, etc, and 
to meet human rights-related concerns about the availability of 
independent, fair trials.212  It has been envisaged that over time 
this Tribunal will play a key role in relation to FSA accountabil-
ity.213  However, the public nature of the Tribunal proceedings 
may in practice deter people from challenging FSA decisions via 
this route because of fears about adverse reputational conse-
quences, even if the challenge is successful.  
  
 207. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2 (Eng.). 
 208. Id. § 2(1)(b).  
 209. Id. § 2(4). 
 210. Id. § 2(3)–(4). 
 211. Id. pt. IX.   
 212. Thomas A. Beazley, Holding the Balance — Effective Enforcement, 
Procedural Fairness and Human Rights, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, supra note 48, at 115–26. 
 213. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 255 (2001). [hereinafter FRESHFIELDS]. 
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The FSA Chairman has claimed that the “prime accountabil-
ity route” for the FSA will be through Ministers to Parlia-
ment,214 but some commentators have doubted how effective 
political accountability will be in relation to the FSA.215  The 
FSA is an unusual hybrid.  It is a private company limited by 
guarantee and its operations are funded entirely by industry 
levy.216  However, the government exercises control in that the 
Treasury appoints the FSA board,217 can order independent re-
views of its financial affairs,218 and can commission independent 
inquiries into regulatory failures.219  The Treasury, however, 
cannot intervene directly in the affairs of the FSA, save in very 
limited circumstances concerned with competition policy.220  The 
FSA must make an annual report to the Treasury.221  The 
Treasury must put the FSA’s report before Parliament.222  FSA 
officials can also be ordered to appear before a parliamentary 
select committee in accordance with the usual procedures of the 
Houses of Parliament.223  In practice, the Treasury Select Com-
mittee routinely takes evidence from the FSA twice a year, once 
on its plan and budget for the coming year, and once on its an-
nual report for the previous year.  It can also hold inquiries 
from time to time as it sees fit.224  Views on whether the system 
of appearing before the Treasury Select Committee is likely to 
prove an effective form of accountability to Parliament, are 
mixed.  Although the IMF considers that appearances by finan-
cial agency officials before a designated public authority — such 
as a parliamentary committee — promote accountability, espe-
cially when the agencies are granted a high degree of auton-
  
 214. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, at Minutes of Evidence 
¶ 2 (question 2, reply by Davies, Chairman FSA).  
 215. See, e.g., Page, supra note 176, at 132–33. 
 216. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 13–14, 17 (Eng.). 
 217. Id. § 1. 
 218. Id. § 12. 
 219. Id. § 14. 
 220. Id. § 308. 
 221. Id. sched. 1, § 10.  The Treasury can direct the FSA with regard to the 
contents of the report. 
 222. Id. § 10(3). 
 223. Id. §§ 4–5. 
 224. Id. § 14.  
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omy,225 others doubt this.226  So far, the evidence indicates that 
appearing before the Treasury Select Committee can be a very 
uncomfortable short-term experience for FSA officials.227  But 
long-term studies will be needed to establish whether this proc-
ess has meaningful impact. 
With regard to public accountability, the FSMA provides for a 
variety of consultation and disclosure requirements.  The FSA 
is required to engage in public consultations before exercising 
rulemaking powers, including publication of rules in draft form 
accompanied by cost-benefit analysis.228  The FSA has a general 
obligation to establish and maintain arrangements for consulta-
tion with consumers and practitioners.229  This gives statutory 
backing to the arrangements that had previously operated in 
practice, whereby the FSA consulted with a Consumer Panel 
and a Practitioner Panel.230  The FSA must have regard to any 
representations made by either of the panels and, if it dis-
agrees, it must give a written statement of its reasons for doing 
so.231   
Again, it is too early to test how well these requirements are 
working.  There are some indications of dissatisfaction with the 
practical operation of the public consultation requirements, 
  
 225. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON 
TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES: DECLARATION OF 
PRINCIPLES 13 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ 
mft/code/eng/code2e.pdf. 
 226. Page, supra note 176, at 134–35. 
 227. As this selection of headlines from the press coverage of Davies’ ap-
pearances before the Select Committee with regard to the Equitable Life crisis 
illustrates.  Katherine Griffiths, MPs Attack Davies Over Equitable Life Cri-
sis, INDEP., Oct. 31, 2001, at 17; Nina Montagu-Smith, FSA Role Puzzles Equi-
table Inquiry, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2001, at 36; FSA Denies Collusion 
with Equitable, INDEP., Nov. 14, 2001, at 21; Davies to Face Second Grilling, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2001, at 28.  
 228. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 65 (Eng.) (guidelines 
for drafting statements or codes that the Authority may issue describing con-
duct expected of approved persons); id. § 121 (guidelines for drafting codes 
that the Authority must issue to give guidance for determining whether be-
havior amounts to market abuse); id. § 155 (guidelines for drafting rules un-
der the Authority’s general rule-making powers).  
 229. Id. §§ 8–9. 
 230. See id. §§ 9(1), 10(1); Press Release, FSA, Practitioner and Consumer 
Panels Go Statutory (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
press/2001/073.html. 
 231. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8, § 11 (Eng.). 
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largely because of the sheer bulk of consultation material that 
the FSA has issued in the past few years, and the resources 
that have gone into responding to it.232  Given the ambitious 
nature of the single regulator project in the U.K., it is hard to 
see how a large and costly consultation process could have been 
avoided, though it undoubtedly did generate “consultation fa-
tigue.”233  However, if discontent about the burdens on industry 
and consumers, which are associated with the consultation re-
quirements, does not diminish as the regime becomes more es-
tablished, this could indicate a serious flaw within the system.  
The system will also have failed if the FSA develops a reputa-
tion for not listening to the criticisms expressed by those who 
respond to consultation exercises.  The FSA will always be vul-
nerable to this charge, but time and experience will help to dis-
tinguish well-founded claims from exaggerated claims made to 
garner media attention for the self-interested views of a par-
ticular group or sector.234  
Is the independence of the practitioner and consumer panels 
liable to be compromised because of their position within the 
formal institutional framework?  To be sure, these panels are 
established by the FSA, the FSA board appoints the members, 
and it also funds their operation.235  Moreover, the Consumer 
Panel, which operates more formally and publicly than the 
Practitioner Panel, is dependent on FSA staff for its secre-
  
 232. Jill Treanor FSA “Less Effective” Than Predecessors GUARDIAN (Lon-
don), Nov. 29, 2002, at 30; BBC News, FSA World’s “Most Accountable Regula-
tor” (Dec. 3, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2539001.stm. 
 233. INQUIRY INTO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION ’S PRACTITIONER 
PANEL BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY (2002), at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/ 
cmtreasy/600/2020503.htm (statement of Donald Brydon, Chairman of the 
Practitioner Panel & Chairman and Chief Executive of AXA Investment Man-
agers) [hereinafter INQUIRY INTO THE FSA’S PRACTITIONER PANEL].  
 234. CSFI, WAKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 13 (noting complaints 
from industry participants that their comments have been ignored by the FSA 
but suggests that this criticism is not altogether fair).  The Consumers Asso-
ciation has also accused the FSA of failing to listen to objections about FSA 
proposals for new rules on the way financial products are sold to investors.  
Teresa Hunter, Consumer Group Savages FSA Plans: CA Says Adviser Re-
forms will be Confusing and Add to Costs, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 28, 2002, 
at 4; William Kay, Consumers Rip into FSA Proposals, INDEP., Apr. 27, 2002, 
at 1.  
 235. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1(9)–(10) (Eng.). 
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tariat.236  All of these features suggest that the panels may 
struggle to achieve and maintain independence.237  A report in 
The Observer on the Consumer Panel’s annual report encapsu-
lates the issue neatly with the comment: “Brown [chair of the 
Consumer Panel] remains confident and hopeful that the FSA 
can clean up the financial services industry.  His own job de-
pends on it, after all.”238  The counterargument is that the close 
links should facilitate constructive and better-informed dia-
logue between the FSA and the panels.  The structure is, then, 
best viewed as a compromise between true arms-length inde-
pendence, and privileged access to FSA information and per-
sonnel.  Whether the optimal trade-offs have been made will be 
a question for future study.   
V. A CONCLUSION AND SOME OBSERVATIONS 
The U.K. embraced the single regulator concept in an ambi-
tious way.  It decided to bring many different regulatory agen-
cies together into one single institution.  Moreover, it decided to 
place its single regulator within a new, properly-integrated, le-
gal framework, rather than simply giving it the powers that had 
been previously enjoyed by former regimes, which were divided 
by sector through a process of stitching together or consolidat-
ing existing legislation.  Creating the new integrated legal 
framework was a massive, complex, and time-consuming exer-
cise. Moreover, it was often highly controversial.  But, in the 
end, it was done239 and when the new system finally became 
fully operational, it happened smoothly without disruption to 
the markets.  
Accordingly, one definite conclusion that can be drawn from 
the U.K. experience is that, if the political will is present, major 
reform of this type can actually be accomplished and e ffectuated 
  
 236. Id. ¶ 1(10). 
 237. The Treasury Select Committee has expressed some concerns about the 
panel’s lack of financial independence and the FSA’s control over the selection 
processes.  INQUIRY INTO THE FSA’S PRACTITIONER PANEL, supra note 233 
(Question by Mr. Tyrie, Question 15; Question by Mr. Mudie, Questions 45–
48; Question by Mr. Laws, Questions 89–90). 
 238. Maria Scott, Cash: Incredible: “This Reckless Greed”: Watchdog Attacks 
Industry Where “Consumer is a Dirty Word,” OBSERVER, May 19, 2002, at 2. 
 239. Although details of the new legal regime at the level of the FSA Hand-
book are still to be overhauled.  Davies, Law and Regulation , supra note 91, at 
171–72. 
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within a mature, major international financial center.  The U.K. 
experience also provides support for the intuitive assessment 
that political support for change will be greater where the exist-
ing system is, or is perceived to be, malfunctioning.  Beyond 
this, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions, because the new 
regime is still in its infancy.  Yet there are certainly many posi-
tive signs, in particular, the emphasis on an integrated ap-
proach to regulation across all parts of the financial services 
industry.  
One interesting feature of the recent British experience with 
financial regulation is the extent to which the character of its 
new regime has been associated with its first Chairman, How-
ard Davies.  It is hard to tell whether, or to what extent, the 
degree of identification of the new regime with a single individ-
ual is related to the unitary structure of the FSA, but there may 
be a significant connection.  Arguments for the adoption of the 
single regulator model include economies of scale through uni-
fied management and staffing, and greater effectiveness 
through the development of a single, institutionalized approach 
to regulation.  A corollary of these arguments is that manage-
rial power will be concentrated in relatively few individuals.  
Thus, those at the very top of the structure should be in a par-
ticularly strong position to dominate the culture and institu-
tion.  Questions about governance and structure are particu-
larly important because the single regulator model is character-
ized by a regulatory regime vulnerable to the personal influence 
of a few individuals.  Whether the FSA should have a separate 
chairman and chief executive is an issue that was sidestepped 
in relation to Davies because he was already in office by the 
time the question became a topic for public debate.240  However, 
in a broad sense, the FSMA now requires the FSA to have re-
gard to corporate governance principles.241  Although the sig-
nificance of the FSA’s status as a company should not be taken 
too far, principles developed in the corporate sector to avoid the 
potential adverse effects of domination by one individual could, 
with suitable adaptation for the regulatory context, be useful as 
  
 240. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 112–13.  
 241. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 7 (Eng.).  The duty is 
to have regard to such principles “as it is reasonable to regard as applicable to 
it.”  Id. 
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a way of addressing the potential problem of concentration of 
influence within the unitary FSA regime.   
A potentially worrying sign emanating from the top of the 
FSA is the continuing enthusiasm for further legal change.  
Rather than giving its own staff, and everyone else, breathing 
space in which to work with the new regime, the FSA has de-
clared itself to be a “reforming authority” and has announced “a 
considerable programme of reform to many parts of our rule-
book.”242  This reforming zeal can be defended on the grounds 
that the process of fundamental legal reform that began in 1997 
with the announcement of the proposal to adopt the single regu-
lator model, is still incomplete because the review of the lower-
tier rules, i.e. those in the FSA Handbook, that took place in the 
transitional period, was intended to achieve consistency and 
simplification rather than to re-think fundamental principles. 
Furthermore, standing still for a long time is not a sensible 
strategy in financial regulation because the system needs to 
evolve if it is not to lag too far behind developments in the mar-
ket.  But, while ossification of the system clearly would be in no -
one’s interests, the FSA needs to be careful not to act exces-
sively in the pursuit of the goal of integrated regulation.  
In the sometimes-fevered debate that surrounded the enact-
ment of the FSMA, the prospect of the FSA using its discipli-
nary and enforcement powers excessively tended to attract the 
most attention.  Those fears have receded, partly, but not exclu-
sively,243 because of legal intervention in the form of procedural 
safeguards and, in particular, the establishment of the Finan-
cial Services and Markets Tribunal.  At present, there appears 
to be a reasonable degree of confidence in the robustness of 
these controls on the FSA’s disciplinary powers,244 although this 
confidence has not yet been properly tested under the pressure 
of practical, and perhaps controversial , experience.  As a law-
maker, the FSA is subject to looser forms of control, principally 
in the form of consultation and disclosure requirements, includ-
  
 242. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2001/2002), avail-
able at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar01_02.pdf.  
 243. Changes in personnel at the top of the FSA enforcement division have 
also been thought to have played a part.  In 2001, the head of the FSA’s en-
forcement division was switched to a different position within the organiza-
tion.  
 244. See, e.g., FRESHFIELDS, supra note 213, at 255.  
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ing cost-benefit analysis, underpinned by its obligations with 
regard to statutory regulatory principles and objectives.  How 
effective these controls will be is open to speculation, but it 
seems unlikely that they would prevent a drift towards a more 
legalistic and bureaucratic approach if that is the direction in 
which those in charge of the maturing FSA choose to take it.   
But how much freedom will the FSA actually have to shape 
its own destiny as a rule-maker?  A powerful constraint on the 
FSA’s rule-making discretion is its obligation to give effect to 
EC law.245  Significant parts of the FSA Handbook already re-
flect EC rules on banking, insurance, and securities regula-
tion.246  And the EC influence is increasing as central EC insti-
tutions vigorously pursue the goal of full financial integra-
tion.247  There is a trend away from the established approach of 
minimum harmonization — where the minimum requirements 
are set at central EC level, but with discretion for member 
states to impose stricter requirements (sometimes known as 
“super-equivalence”) towards maximum harmonization, where 
no deviation from the rules set by the central EC authorities is 
permitted.248  Current trends suggest that national regulatory 
authorities of the EC member states will increasingly find their 
autonomy with regard to rulemaking eroded by obligations to 
give effect to requirements that have been set at EC level.  
Their role seems likely to shift from that of direct legislator to 
that of participant in the process whereby rules are developed 
at EC level.249  The goal of ensuring consistency across member 
  
 245. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 148, 410 (Eng.). 
 246. See FSA HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last 
modified Mar. 3, 2003) 
 247. H. Onno Ruding, Vice Chairman, Citibank, Remarks at the Sixth 
European Financial Markets Convention in Brussels (May 31, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.fese.be/initiatives/speeches/2002/efmc2002_ruding_ 
speech.htm. 
 248. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, REVIEW OF THE LISTING REGIME ¶¶ 3.5–
3.25 (July 2002) (discussing European developments and the controversy that 
the switch towards maximum harmonization has provoked with reference to 
the ability of national regulatory authorities to impose corporate governance 
or other qualitative standards beyond those that have been mandated at the 
European level).  
 249. Under the Lamfalussy principles national regulators are involved in 
standard-setting at Level 2 — i.e., filling in the technical details of framework 
legislation that has been agreed (at Level 1) by the main EC legislative or-
gans.  For an overview of the Lamfalussy principles, see Guido Ferrarini, Pan-
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states would suggest that the EC rules are likely to be increas-
ingly prescriptive with little interpretative discretion or waiver 
powers being allowed to individual national regulators.250  So, 
even though the direct focus of the increasing EC activity is on 
standard-setting, it seems also likely to affect the day-to-day 
supervisory relationships between national regulators and 
regulated firms with regard, for example, to questions of inter-
pretation of particular rules, and/or their application to particu-
lar facts, or to applications for rule-waivers in particular cir-
cumstances.    
Some commentators go further and suggest that the EC is 
moving inexorably towards the establishment of new pan-
European regulatory agencies that would perform the full range 
of regulatory and supervisory functions, including enforce-
ment.251   This debate has been particularly active in the secur i-
ties field where the prospect of a European-Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“Euro-SEC”) is much discussed.252  It 
might be said that a shift of regulatory and supervisory powers 
from national to regional agencies is the logical next stage be-
yond regulatory consolidation at the national level, as a step in 
a process that would lead ultimately to the establishment of a 
single worldwide regulator.  Even within Europe, which leads 
the world in the process of regional financial integration, it 
seems unlikely in the short-to-medium term that the FSA, or 
other national regulators, will be replaced by a single Euro-
regulator or even (since EC regulation is still largely con-
structed along sectoral lines) by a group of sectorally-divided 
Euro-regulators.  Banking might look like the most obvious 
candidate for the assumption of a full regulatory and supervi-
sory role by European institutions but the European Central 
Bank, which is responsible for monetary policy within the euro 
  
European Securities Markets: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses, 3 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. § 2.3 (2002).  
 250. Level 3 of the Lamfalussy principles aims to encourage cooperation and 
networking between national regulators to ensure consistent and equivalent 
application of the rules.  The recently-established Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) is to play a key role in issuing guidelines, joint 
interpretative guidance and so forth.  See id. 
 251. NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 896–97 (Francis G. Ja-
cobs ed., 2002).  Chapter 15 provides an admirable summary of the arguments 
for and against EC centralized regulation and supervision. 
 252. Id. at 843–97.  
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area, has recently affirmed that the division of responsibilities 
between itself and national authorities “would seem appropri-
ate to tackle the changes triggered by the introduction of the 
euro.”253  Public policy debate on fundamental questions about 
the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of super-
European regulatory and supervisory agencies is starting but, 
as yet, it is at an early stage.254    
However things develop, it seems beyond doubt that in the 
short-to-medium term, the drive for further regulatory changes 
affecting the financial sector will come from Europe.  It remains 
to be seen whether the U.K. will be in a strong position to influ-
ence change at that level because it has already been through 
radical upheaval domestically, or whether the U.K. will be 
found to have made a major strategic mistake by being inward-
looking at a time when major reform initiatives were beginning 
to take shape at the European level.  Domestically, although 
political challenges to the existence of the FSA are always pos-
sible, no major political party is likely to espouse the case for 
further radical, expensive, and disruptive change unless either 
the FSA fails to deliver the benefits claimed for the single regu-
lator model or that model becomes wholly inappropriate be-
cause of changing market conditions.  The latter point has par-
ticular current relevance because the general economic climate 
and specific events such as WorldCom and Enron have high-
lighted the particularly acute conflict of interest problems that 
can arise within financial supermarkets. These events have 
added an extra dimension to the debate about the advantages of 
the “universal banking” business model.255  “Deconglomeration” 
  
 253. ECB, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS, supra note 194, at 7. 
 254. See, e.g., Chris Bates, Models for European Regulation: Euro-SEC, 
Euro-FSA or Lamfalussy?, 17 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. LAW 151 (2002); Jeroen 
Kremers et al., Does Europe Need a Euro-wide Supervisor?,  6 FIN. REG. 50 
(2001).  
 255. Thanks a Bundle — The Model of a Vast, Integrated Financial Firm is 
Fast Going Out of Favour, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 2002, at 12; Wilmarth, supra 
note 113, at 272–312, 437–44 (discussing disappointing results achieved by 
banks resulting from big bank mergers).  Wilmarth doubts the ability of big, 
complex financial institutions to produce positive synergies of scale or scope.  
Id. at 438.  Further he suggests that arguments used in relation to disen-
chantment with conglomeration in the industrial sector (e.g., that managers 
are motivated to build large companies for self interested reasons rather than 
in pursuit of better returns for investors) are also applicable to the financial 
sector.  Id. at 284–85. 
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within the financial sector could occur as it did previously in the 
industrial sector.  If firms were to retreat back to the safety of 
traditional sectorally-divided business, claims about the good 
“fit” of the single regulator model to the nature of regulated 
markets and firms would become increasingly hollow.  
Time and experience should provide some answers to ques-
tions and concerns about the single regulator model that have 
been raised in this article.  The U.K. will now be a valuable 
source of data on whether, or in what ways, the single regulator 
model is superior to alternative models of regulation, in terms 
of suitability, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. Prac-
tical operation of the new regime will also shed light on the ro-
bustness of an ambitious, tailor-made, legislative framework 
that was designed expressly to help secure the potential bene-
fits of the single regulator model and avoid its possible draw-
backs.256  
  
 256. See BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 11 (identi-
fying the U.K.’s integrated legislative framework as being a particular advan-
tage).  
